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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PUBLIC
By Darren Welch
The Supreme Court has long kept its internal workings a secret. Whether it be the code of
confidentiality that law clerks are required to follow, the ban on cameras, reluctant accommodation of
the press, or the guarding of internal information, the Supreme Court has always been the most shy of
the three branches of government.
Outsiders have a difficult time trying to figure out what goes on inside the Supreme Court building.
The only time the court meets the public is in its annual photo shoot and oral arguments. Even the oral
arguments, which are public proceedings (and can be quite entertaining, thanks to the highly inquisitive)
are kept out of the public eye to a large extent. Members of the public wait outside the building in the
morning trying to get one of the limited seats in the courtroom. The press are seated behind large
concrete pillars where perhaps a lucky few can see the faces of the justices.
Cameras and personal audio recording devices are not allowed in the courtroom. The Supreme Court
follows a policy that so long as one justice opposes cameras in the courtroom, cameras will not be
allowed in the courtroom. Justice David Souter, at 56 one of the younger justices, has announced that
cameras will enter the Supreme Court "over my dead body."
Audio recordings of the oral arguments are available at the national archives, but the court requires
listeners to agree not to reproduce or sell the recordings. In 1993, Professor Peter Irons released May
It Please the Court, edited transcripts and accompanying narrated audio tapes of oral arguments for
many prominent cases in Supreme Court history, clearly in violation of the agreement Irons signed to
gain access to the tapes he copied. This angered the Court and even prompted the Court to threaten
legal action against Professor Irons.
The Court requires strict confidentiality from its law clerks. This code of conduct was allegedly
breached by Edward Lazarus, former justice clerk for Harry Blackmun, when he wrote "Closed
Chambers" about the internal workings of the Supreme Court. Lazarus is accused of betraying the trust
of the court by publishing an eye-witness account of the internal workings of the court.
The release of the private papers of the late Thurgood Marshall caused a stir at the Supreme Court.
The Court threatened to withhold future releases to the Library of Congress. Approximately 173,000
documents, including interoffice memorandum, drafts of opinions, and notes on secrets conferences were
given to the Library by Thurgood Marshall with the instruction that they be displayed without restriction.
The court tried unsuccessfully to stop the display in order to protect the secret deliberations and internal
workings of the court.
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THE MYSTERIOUS SUPREME COURT: ONLY THE SUPREME COURT IS CLOSED TO
TELEVISION
The Village Voice
May 20, 1997
Nat Hentoff
There is no danger I apprehend so much as the consolidation of our government by the noiseless secret
instrumentality of the Supreme Court.
--Thomas Jefferson, 1823
It is of the highest moment that those who administer justice should always act.. .under the public
eye....
--Oliver Wendell Holmes, 1884
One morning, in his chambers, Justice William Brennan was reading newly received poll results. And
he was laughing. I asked him why. The survey, he said, had to do with the degree to which the public
recognizes the names of Supreme Court justices. Only 5 per cent knew that Brennan was on the Court.
"Doesn't that bother you?" I asked.
Well, Brennan said, laughing again, only 1 per cent know who Harry Blackmun is.
This continuing widespread ignorance about the Supreme Court--not only the names of its members
but what the Court does and why--is largely due to the Court's cult of secrecy.
The most conspicuous illustration of this secrecy is the Court's absolute refusal to televise the oral
arguments on cases before it. Currently 40 states allow cameras in courtrooms in civil cases, and in 39
states, cameras are present in criminal cases. But the court of last resort--where fundamental, far-
reaching decisions are made about issues that affect many millions of Americans--is closed to public
scrutiny.
The justices delight in their anonymity. When Harry Blackmun, the author of Roe v. Wade, was on
the Court, he enjoyed standing on the sidewalk near the Court and listening to knots of prolifers talking
furiously about him--with no idea that he was right there.
Four years ago, Justice Byron White, now retired, admitted during a Colorado Springs conference:
"I suspect as time goes on the Court will be made up of justices who will ask, 'What was wrong with
those old guys who resisted television'" ? "But", White added, "I am very pleased to walk around, and
very, very seldom am I recognized. It s very selfish, I know."
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It's not so much their faces we ought to be able to recognize as how each of them thinks, what biases
they have, how carefully they weigh individual rights and liberties against government power. It is only
during oral arguments--the only time they are together in public except for the annual photograph--that
they come through as human, not as distant, mysterious icons. The questions they ask, their jabs at one
another, their very temperaments are clues to their decisions in that case--and cases to come.
These are the nine people who will decide this term whether assisted suicide--and its corollary,
euthanasia--are constitutional. And whether the government will be allowed to impose crippling
censorship on the Internet. Each term the justices define fairness--due process--in cases whose
ramifications can very well affect you down the line.
Well, some of the justices say, you can read printed summaries and excerpts from the oral arguments.
But very few papers--The New York Times, The Washington Post, and sometimes USA Today--quote
extensively from those sessions, and even they only quote from high-profile cases. Otherwise, you have
to pay--a lot--for transcripts, and only lawyers, law professors, and some journalists do.
Well, you can read about their final decisions. But, with few exceptions, newspapers--as law professor
Thomas Baker says-- report Supreme Court decisions more like sports scores. Without history and
context. And television networks have largely abdicated any sense of responsibility to tell us, except
glancingly, what the Court has done, and what that will mean to us.
Contrary to some reports, Chief Justice William Rehnquist is not opposed to cameras during oral
arguments. He has even conducted a tour of the courtroom for an advocate of TV coverage and has
shown where he would want the cameras to be placed. But Rehnquist has made it clear that he will never
allow the cameras in so long as any one of the justices disapproves.
A number of them do very strongly disapprove, particularly David Souter. On February 13, during a
hearing on the Court's budget for the next year, he told a congressional subcommittee that he has not
changed his attitude toward television in the court. In a previous appearance, he said--and has now
confirmed--that cameras will come in only over my dead body.
And Souter, a close friend of William Brennan, is one of the more thoughtful members of the Court.
Except on this subject. While Brennan, an advocate of open justice, was there, he told me he had no
objection to cameras. But Souter said to the subcommittee that TV would bring entertainment values.
Actually, Antonin Scalia, possessed of the liveliest wit on the Court, is often very entertaining. We
shouldn t see that?
Souter also said it's important that the judicial branch not be subject to the same publicity as the
political branches of government. So we are to be kept in the dark about the nine most powerful people
in the country?
And, he emphasized, it's important to preserve the symbolism that distinguishes the Supreme Court
from the rest of government. Does he mean merely from the rest of government that is publicly
accountable to the people?
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Ah, but Souter fears the greater public pressure on the justices that cameras in the courtroom would
bring. Said the Times: "As for pressure, a justice who allows the currents of public opinion to influence
decision-making does not belong on the nation s highest court in the first place."
What can be done to make the Supreme Court recognize--as Oliver Wendell Holmes said--that justice
should always act under the public eye?
Leon Friedman, a law professor at Hofstra and an active constitutional litigator, told me of what
happened when the O.J. Simpson civil trial was closed to television. An enterprising cable network took
the transcripts of the trial--which were public--and hired actors to impersonate the principals.
Why not, Friedman suggests, hire actors to impersonate the Supreme Court justices--on cable--and
perform from the transcripts of the oral arguments? Out of vanity and embarrassment, the justices might
then decide to be themselves on TV. Let's begin with a bearded Danny DeVito as Antonin Scalia.
Copyright 1997 VV Publishing Corporation
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JUSTICE AT THE HIGH COURT: NOT BLIND ENOUGH?
June 15, 1998
Lawrence R. Velvel
The Washington Post
CLOSED CHAMBERS
The First Eyewitness Account of the Epic Struggles Inside the Supreme Court
By Edward Lazarus
Times Books. 576 pp. $27.50
In "Closed Chambers," Edward Lazarus, who clerked for Justice Harry A. Blackmun in 1988-89, has
written more than 500 pages on the inner workings of the Supreme Court. He gives endless descriptions
of cases decided 20, 40 or 60 years ago and of the views of individual justices (including some who have
not been on the court for 25 years or more), turning what would be a great read at 250 pages into a
chore. What a shame. For Lazarus has some enormously valuable things to say -- things important to
the country and often applicable to lower courts as well, but which are rarely discussed outside the tiny
fraternity of Supreme Court experts.
The book's major theme is the way the Supreme Court should conduct itself Issues of race, states'
rights, limits on federal authority, capital punishment, abortion, gay rights, religious freedom,
presidential prerogative: To the high court come the great questions of the day, questions that are
inescapably political even when dressed in legal garb. Therefore, to maintain "the thin but crucial divide
between law and politics," Lazarus believes that the justices must deliberate intelligently and with open
minds. They must argue with integrity, honesty, sincerity and consistency. They must disagree
respectfully. They must exercise self-restraint.
Lazarus is right in believing that at bottom it is the manner of performance, the style of it, that is the
ultimate divide between law and politics. But what he found at the court conflicts greatly with his views
regarding appropriate judicial conduct.
Lazarus found justices unalterably attached to bitterly opposed views, unwilling to listen to the other
side, unwilling to accommodate or even to discuss each other's points. Divided into factions, justices
circulated memos and drafts to allies while withholding the information from opponents. They made
arguments they could not possibly believe. They acted on the basis of feelings that lawyers could not
know they held and therefore could not respond to (which makes a mockery of the claim that the court
is the only agency of government that states the reasons for its actions). To achieve a desired result, they
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followed theories or precedent in one case, only to ignore them in the next. They overlooked facts. They
savagely insulted one another. They manipulated rules.
Expectably, Lazarus pleads for a change in the way the court conducts itself His plea is sensible, and
applies to lower courts, too.
"Closed Chambers" also critiques the influence of the justices' law clerks, who are usually young, in
their mid- to late twenties, with little experience of life or the real world. They have performed brilliantly
in a handful of law schools, and many have developed a high sense of self-worth, encouraged by their
elders in an elitist profession. They are usually white.
Lazarus believes that these inexperienced individuals exercise enormous influence in a variety of ways.
Although there are certain checks that may help ensure the integrity of the process, a single young clerk
may write the memorandum that persuades the court whether to hear a case. This is perhaps the most
upsetting point in the book. The clerks almost always write the crucially important first drafts of
opinions; sometimes the drafts are only lightly edited by justices, and wording and ideas that deeply
influence the future can be a clerk's. The clerks discuss cases with their justices and, Lazarus says, may
make extensive, sometimes successful efforts to bring them to their point of view. Clerks, Lazarus says,
sometimes band together to try to attain particular results.
Not everyone agrees that clerks wield the power Lazarus ascribes to them. But there is little dispute
that, whatever the exact degree of their influence, it is, as a lawyer might say, not inconsiderable.
Lazarus believes there have been times when clerks in the Supreme Court have in effect been justices,
or nearly so. Being a 26-year-old Supreme Court justice, or near-justice, is nice work if you can get it.
In "Closed Chambers," Lazarus has opened a window on matters that are usually kept secret -- and
he has taken heat for doing so. There have always been those -- justices and experts alike -- who believe
that the court's prestige and authority will be compromised if secrecy is lost. As with sausage, the public
might be revolted if it saw how the product is produced. But in the long run, prestige and American
democracy will both be better served by courts whose hallmarks are honesty, intelligence, intellectual
integrity and consistency. Lazarus should be praised, not condemned, for shedding light where it is
needed.
By Lawrence R. Velvel, dean of the Massachusetts School of Law.
Copyright 1998 The Washington Post
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BETRAYING A TRUST
The Washington Post
June 17, 1998
Gretchen Craft Rubin
Edward Lazarus, a former clerk for Justice Harry A. Blackmun, has betrayed a fundamental tenet for
people who hold such jobs by discussing the Supreme Court's inner workings in his new book, "Closed
Chambers." Perhaps only the justices themselves and former clerks (of whom I am one) can appreciate
just what a break with tradition this book represents.
Unlike other Washington back-stagers, Supreme Court clerks have until now stayed out of the
spotlight. But for Lazarus, apparently, the temptation to claim his own part in the high court's drama
became too strong to resist. Focusing on a few controversial issues, Lazarus exposes much about the
court's confidential processes. By being the first flatly to break the code of confidentiality, he vaults
himself into the public eye and capitalizes on others' sense of their duty to remain silent.
Lazarus sighs about how "quaint" Chief Justice William Rehnquist's words sounded when he talked
to the clerks early in the 1988-1989 term about their positions of public trust. As Lazarus reports, the
chief justice read from the Code of Conduct that requires clerks "to comply with the demanding
standards" of their position. Lazarus doesn't mention the sections of the code that clearly bar the writing
of his book.
The code provides that: "A law clerk should never disclose to any person any confidential information
received in the course of the law clerk's duties, nor should the law clerk employ such information for
personal gain." It continues, "The law clerk should take particular care that Court documents not
available to the public are not taken from the Court building or handled so as to compromise their
confidentiality within chambers or the Court building in general."
Surely these describe exactly how Lazarus got his most newsworthy material. More puzzling is how
he got hold of non-public documents that never were circulated to Blackmun or to him. His information
must have come from others -- though we're not told how or in what context.
Lazarus does reveal pangs of a guilty conscience by making excuses for himself He invents his own
code: "[I]n describing the private decision-making of the Justices, I have been careful to avoid disclosing
information I am privy to solely because I was privileged to work for Justice Blackmun."
But almost every disclosure he makes is directly rooted in his clerkship with Blackmun. Perhaps he
means that he persuaded other clerks to relate their stories, but that can't make a difference because
clerks may discuss confidential matters, it's impossible for them to "leak" in a way that would free
Lazarus to tell all.
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What's more, Lazarus forgets that he had the trust not only of Blackmun but of all the justices. From
the code: "Separate and apart from the duty owed by each law clerk to the appointing Justice is the duty
owed by each law clerk to the Court as a body."
Perversely, Lazarus's vow of confidentiality enables him to cloak his boss in a secrecy that he strips
away from the other justices. We learn about conversations, daily routines and decision-making in other
chambers, but not in the one chamber Lazarus knows firsthand. It's not clear why Lazarus feels that it's
more honorable to disclose confidential information about other justices than about his own.
This book exploits the fact that his account won't be challenged by other participants who feel honor-
bound to respect the court's confidentiality. As the sole insider's account, "Closed Chambers" will be
artificially authoritative, because it is the only perspective available.
Perhaps Lazarus thinks of himself as courageous, bucking the potential wrath of the justices to shed
"light and clarity" on important truths. But it's a poor sort of courage to betray the trust of your
colleagues for your own advancement.
The truth is that Lazarus could have made his principal arguments without violating any confidences.
But that kind of writing makes for law review articles, not for interviews on the "Today Show" or NPR
or reviews in major newspapers. For that kind of coverage, you need a sexy hook, like an unprecedented
eyewitness account.
The irony of "Closed Chambers" is that it will exacerbate the problems that Lazarus decries. He urges
the justices to deliberate more searchingly, but he is only encouraging greater reserve. The previously
unthinkable possibility that some clerk is sneaking out copies of sensitive documents and jotting down
every word is certain to hamper communications. Lazarus laments the suspicion he sees among the
justices and among the clerks; his book won't promote trust among colleagues. He rails against the
growing politicization of the clerks; future clerks, certain to read his book before starting, will arrive
expecting to find -- and therefore more likely to create -- a courthouse filled with scheming co-workers.
He urges the court to act like a court, not like the political branches; following his example, why not
leak a conference memo to the New York Times to pressure a justice to reverse position in a pending
case?
Will Lazarus, now a federal prosecutor, be sanctioned in any way? Most likely not. Perhaps his book
will come and go quickly enough to limit its poisonous influence. But I'm afraid that it's more likely to
make others feel that they, too, should be free to tell and sell their stories.
The writer was a clerk for Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in the 1995-96 term.
Copyright 1998 The Washington Post
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THE SUPREME COURT MUST BEAR SCRUTINY
The Washington Post
July 06, 1998
Edward Lazarus
In my book, "Closed Chambers," I argue that in the recent past the justices of the Supreme Court
succumbed to the same poisonous spirit of partisanship that infects the rest of our body politic and that
this spirit so corrupted their deliberations that it has placed in jeopardy the court's essential legitimacy.
To date, none of my critics seriously has disputed this thesis. Instead, as in Gretchen Craft Rubin's
tirade ["Betraying a Trust," op-ed, June 17], a chorus of court courtiers has conducted a kill-the-
messenger campaign. They claim not that I am wrong, but that, as a former clerk at the court, I
somehow should be sanctioned for violating my ethical duties (specifically the Law Clerk Code of
Conduct) by explaining to a general audience deep flaws in how the justices decided a number of
important cases.
These ethical charges are demonstrably false. The real complaint of Rubin and other court defenders
seems to be that a former clerk has exposed to the general public what previously court intimates -- and
only they -- have known: that in recent history the court has fallen far short of the mark in carrying out
its constitutional mission. Evidently, these critics think it an act of disloyalty to have brought such
failings to light.
But it is an act of devotion not disloyalty to seek to hold the justices accountable to the court's highest
ideals and purposes. The method of their decision-making is the irreplaceable source of the court's
legitimacy. When the court's nine, unelected, life-tenured justices ignore the thin but crucial line between
law and politics, they call into question why the nation authorizes them to decide many of its most
intractable social dilemmas. It is perverse to argue that the role of illuminating the court's processes
cannot be performed by a former employee, but only by outsiders less able to penetrate the shroud of
secrecy in which the court insists on cloaking itself
As for the ethical charges, they are clearly a smoke screen. First, the Law Clerk Code of Conduct,
including its confidentiality provision, applies only to clerks during their time at the court (to protect
deliberation on pending and impending cases) and has no bearing on the propriety of a former clerk
writing a book. This is obvious from the code's "Effective Date of Compliance" section (omitted by
Rubin), which reads: "A person to whom this Code becomes applicable shall comply with it immediately
upon commencement of his or her clerkship and throughout such clerkship." That the code applies only
to current clerks is confirmed by the context of the code's confidentiality provision, which appears in
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a section devoted to a law clerk's duties at the court, and by the code's penalty provision, which is
limited explicitly to dismissal as a clerk.
But even if, as Rubin implausibly claims, the code has some application to former clerks, I did not
violate it. "Closed Chambers" is not a "tell all," as she and others characterize it. It is a work of research
and reportage, undoubtedly benefitting from the perspective I gained as a clerk, but not employing any
confidential material that I was privy to solely because of that experience.
The source for most of my book's discussion of the court's internal workings -- and so identified in
my "author's note" -- was the public record provided by one of the court's own members. The Thurgood
Marshall Papers, which Justice Marshall made freely available at the Library of Congress, include his
notes on the justices' private conferences as well as every internal memorandum, letter and draft opinion
that crossed his desk prior to his retirement in 1991.
True, my book does contain some material that does not appear in the Marshall Papers. My critics are
especially upset because I revealed that in a major 1989 abortion case, the conservative justices, led by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, tried to decide the fate of Roe v. Wade behind the backs of the liberal justices.
None of the liberal justices knew of this private caucus. As a clerk for Justice Harry Blackmun, neither
did I. Rather, I learned of it (and other disturbing matters outside the public record) long after I ceased
working at the court by developing dozens of sources -- that is, by using the standard methods of a
journalist and scholar.
There is no ethical prohibition, formal or otherwise, on a former clerk using such methods to conduct
a serious investigation of the court's processes. Indeed, we welcome similar works by former employees
of the other branches of government (such as Richard Holbrooke's much acclaimed new book on
Bosnia) because they help us evaluate our national leadership and improve our institutions. I undertook
"Closed Chambers" with exactly these goals in mind.
This is not to say that the court has no need for confidentiality. It does with respect to pending and
impending cases -- and I have respected this. Nor is it to say that law clerks do not have certain
obligations of circumspection. They do -- and I omitted from my book matters I knew only because I
served as a clerk (including every discussion I had with my boss, Justice Blackmun).
But, in the end, the court is a public institution, the justices are public servants and the integrity of
their work is a subject of crucial public importance. Those who would insulate it from scrutiny, distract
attention from its problems and deter future critics by assassinating my character would do better to
heed the teachings of Justice Frankfurter, who wrote: "Justices must be kept mindful of their limitations
and their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous stream of criticism expressed with candor, however
blunt."
The writer is the author of "Closed Chambers: The First Eyewitness Account of the Epic Struggles
Inside the Supreme Court."
Copyright 1998 The Washington Post
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SUPREME COURT'S GREATEST HITS
Sacramento Bee
August 28, 1993
William Safire
If the Supreme Court gets angry at you, can it take you to court?
Yes. In 1906, the court ordered a stay of execution of a black man found guilty of raping a white
woman in Tennessee, pending its review of an appeal. When a mob then lynched the defendant, the
angry.Supreme Court issued a contempt citation against the local sheriff for not protecting the accused.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in U.S. vs. Shipp, made clear the court had the power to direct
discipline on its own motion.
That precedent gives weight to the mutters and grumbles emanating from the Supreme Court these
days on a considerably lesser offense: the unauthorized sale of audio tapes of the court's greatest hits.
"May It Please the Court," a title based on the traditional opening of oral argument, arrived at my
office the other day, subtitled "23 landmark cases as argued before the Supreme Court, including the
actual voices of the attorneys and justices in oral argument and questioning." Long subtitle, but a
fascinating you-are-there experience, packaged with a book of transcripts and commentary by Peter
Irons and Stephanie Guitton.
HERE IS the voice of the lawyer Abe Fortas, representing Clarence Gideon in a case that established
the right of the indigent accused to legal counsel (and led Anthony Lewis to write "Gideon's Trumpet");
here is a youthful Thurgood Marshall urging school integration against a school board and governor
who argued that it disrupted public order; here is the lawyer Sarah Weddington representing "Jane Roe,"
at first stumbling on the constitutional basis for abortion rights, then pressing her case against the Texas
official representing what he called "the true silent majority" of the unborn.
This is an ear to history in the making. The accompanying transcript in the $75 tape-and-book package
is useful, but the excitement is in the actual voices of disputing lawyers and probing justices.
Problem: Making it available to a wide public breaks the court's rules. On Aug. 3, the court's public
information office - acting with the approval of, or at the instigation of, Chief Justice William Rehnquist
-- issued a statement pointing out that Irons had signed an agreement to use the tapes "for private
research and teaching purposes only" and had pledged "not to reproduce . . . for any purposes any
portion of such audiotape."
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Then came the chilling warning from Toni House, the ordinarily sensible press officer: "In light of
these clear violations of Professor Irons' contractual commitments, the court is considering what legal
remedies may be appropriate." That vague threat conjured the ghost of Sheriff Shipp in a case that did
not spring unassisted to my mind. This court is touchy about its own privacy; earlier this year it lost a
contretemps with the librarian of Congress on the release of Thurgood Marshall's papers.
In this case, as Tony Mauro, a reporter for USA Today and Legal Times pointed out, "Irons is
treading on another of the court's deeply held tenets: Its distaste for commercialism."
Public officials with their heads in the 19th century think they can keep public records from
commercial exploitation by limiting their use to "scholarly research." That's like being a little bit
pregnant; as the Dead Sea Scroll monopolists learned, unless a public document or tape or photo is a
national secret or an invasion of privacy, it should be and will be available for dissemination in any way
the market system decides.
TAPES -- yesterday audio, tomorrow video -- of open court argument are the public's property, not
the personal trusts of the justices. If I want to photograph the Declaration of Independence and sell it
on a T-shirt, that's my business, not the National Archives'.
But didn't the professor break his word? Of course he did, in the knowledge that the agreement was
as unenforceable as a restrictive covenant. Good for him. If anyone now wants to dub the same tapes,
re-edit them with original commentary and beat his price, that's our system.
The Supreme Court "conferences," to use its verb, on the final Monday in September, before
convening on the first Monday in October. The other eight should get the chief to back off. Let the new
interest in court proceedings generated by the tapes inspire them to sharpen and deepen their
questioning, because tomorrow's scholars and kibitzers will be listening in digital splendor.
Copyright 1993 McClatchy Newspapers, Inc.
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JUSTICES UNAMUSED BY INSIDER LOOK AT COURT:
LAWYER RELEASES AUDIOTAPES FOUND IN ARCHIVES
The Dallas Morning News
September 26, 1993
Tony Perry, Los Angeles Times
SAN DIEGO - Like a lot of lawyers, Peter Irons dreams of someday arguing a case before the U.S.
Supreme Court.
He concedes, though, that this might not be the best time. "I'm not sure it would be in the best
interests of my clients," he said.
The reason is simple as a poke in the eye. The Supreme Court is extremely upset at the 53-year-old
professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego.
So annoyed is the court at Dr. Irons that the justices have taken the extraordinary step of issuing a
statement threatening him with legal action. Court watchers say nothing like this has happened since
1906.
The court is angered by what Dr. Irons did with an intellectual treasure trove he discovered at the
National Archives: audio tape-recordings made by the court of open arguments in 23 landmark cases,
including those concerning abortion, the Pentagon Papers, the Watergate tapes, school prayer,
affirmative action, flag burning, gay rights, civil rights, school desegregation and a criminal defendant's
right to counsel.
On the tapes, lawyers can be heard pleading their cases and being peppered with questions from the
justices, as monumental social issues hang in the balance.
"This is really American history in a form that nobody has ever experienced before," Dr. Irons said.
"It's as if someone suddenly came up with a tape of the Lincoln-Douglas debates."
As director of the university's Earl Warren Bill of Rights Project, which is dedicated to finding
innovative ways to teach the Bill of Rights, Dr. Irons immediately determined that the tapes had to be
made public, not just to a few researchers, but to anyone who wants to hear them.
The result is a nonprofit venture soon to be available to bookstores nationwide at $75 a copy, May
It Please The Court, a 370-page book and six 90-minute audio cassettes. The tapes were judiciously
edited by Dr. Irons and his associate Stephanie Guitton, with narration by Dr. Irons.
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The problem is that to get access to the tapes from the National Archives, Dr. Irons had to sign an
agreement that he would not duplicate or distribute the tapes or make them available for broadcast, all
of which he has done.
The Supreme Court demands that the archives require all researchers to sign such an agreement,
which stems from the court's pique when CBS News broadcast part of a tape from the Pentagon Papers
case.
In a statement issued Aug. 3, the court accused Dr. Irons of breaking his agreement despite being
warned: "In light of this clear violation of Professor Irons' contractual commitments, the Court is
considering what legal remedies may be appropriate."
Dr. Irons questions whether the court has the right to place such severe restrictions on the tapes,
which are public property and taken from open sessions. "I'm not agreeing that the agreement is
binding," he said.
As a dedicated confrontationalist, he is not too worried about the court's fulminations. "It's like some
volcano that's sputtering," he said. "You don't really know if it's going to erupt."
Guesses on what the court might do range from issuing a scalding statement to referring the case to
the Justice Department for prosecution for breach of contract.
Dr. Irons has secured permission from all the lawyers heard on the tapes and several provided book
blurbs. Rep. Louis Stokes, D-Ohio, who as a private attorney argued a 1967 case that established the
right of citizens to be free from arbitrary "stop and frisk" by police, calls Dr. Irons' efforts "an important
educational project."
Supreme Court scholars are split.
David Currie, law professor at the University of Chicago and author of the two-volume The
Constitution in The Supreme Court, said that he is troubled by the idea of a lawyer breaking an
agreement but that he believes the court should not attempt to restrict the sale or broadcast of the tapes.
"I would have great sympathy with the court's position if someone was prying into the secret
deliberations of the court," Mr. Currie said. "But that is not at all what happened. These are tapes of
public proceedings."
"All this man is doing is trying to make these tapes available in a format that heightens their
entertainment value," Dr. Fried said. "I don't see why that's necessary."
Copyright 1993 The Dallas Morning News
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FAIR PLAY; 'FREE SPEECH' JUSTICES SHOULDN'T FIGHT AIRING OF
ARGUMENT TAPES
Pennsylvania Law Journal
October 4, 1993
Gideon Kanner, Professor of Law Emeritus at Loyola Law School and a columnist for the Los
Angeles Daily Journal.
There they go again. First, the U.S. Supreme Court Justices got all upset when one of their departed
brethren, Justice Thurgood Marshall, left his papers to the Library of Congress with directions that they
be made available to the public at the library's discretion. Now the justices are upset again because
Professor Peter Irons, who teaches political science at the University of California in San Diego, is
publishing tape recordings of Supreme Court oral arguments in significant cases.
The problem is that in order to get access to those tapes at the National Archives, Irons had to sign
an agreement promising not to duplicate or distribute them, or make them available for broadcast. But
although a gentleman is supposed to keep his word, Irons takes the position that the agreement is illegal
as a restraint on free speech, and he appears unimpressed by a statement issued by the court indicating
its displeasure with his efforts, and evidently trying to chill them by hints of threatened legal action.
What Irons is up to is the non-profit publication of a 370-page book titled "May It Please the Court."
In addition to the text, the book comes with audio tapes of oral arguments in the U.S. Supreme Court
in 23 cases including such golden oldies as Brown v. Board of Education, the Pentagon Papers case,
Gideon v. Wainwright and Roe v. Wade.
The recordings are accessible to the public at the National Archives, but with the proviso that their
users must agree not to duplicate or distribute them, nor make them available for broadcasts.
Legally, the justices are in a tight spot. It is difficult to see how Irons' proposed publishing project
even remotely approaches the kind of irreparable harm that would justify prior restraint. As for a
remedy at law, if Irons goes ahead with the distribution of his book, it is equally difficult to see what
the court's damages could be.
After all, the justices do not own the tapes, those are public records residing in the National Archives
where they are accessible to all, and their widespread distribution neither causes damages nor deprives
the government of revenues. Irons says that he does not intend to profit from their publication, so a
case of unjust enrichment does not appear justified either. So what's the harm?
Former Solicitor General Charles Fried is quoted in The Los Angeles Times as suggesting that selling
the tapes will trivialize the court since written transcripts of arguments are available.
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Professor Fried is a serious gentleman, and he may actually believe that his suggestion is serious. But
others can surely disagree. Since written transcripts of those oral arguments are already available,
what's the big deal? How will listening to them on a larger scale trivialize anything? Besides, those of
us who toil in the appellate vineyards know that there can be an enormous difference between seeing
and hearing what transpires in a courtroom, and what is known in the trade as "the cold record." To
hear that difference may be quite educational.
By listening to the tapes one can tell which justice asked which question, whereas the transcripts only
precede the text of each question from the bench with the word, "QUESTION:" without identifying the
questioner.
As those of us who have argued before the court can attest, some of the questions flung from the
bench at lawyers trying to represent their clients can be ungracious, rude and on occasion -- dare I say
it? -- off the wall. Sometimes the justices' utterances leave one with the suspicion that the questioner
may be something less than fully prepared when a case is called.
It is therefore entirely possible that the justices are something less than eager to have us hear not just
their words, but the identifiable voice of each questioner. The tone, and the occasional disregard of
counsel's earnest effort to make a point, only to be interrupted and hectored by another justice, or even,
alas, by the same justice who asked the question that the lawyer is now prevented from answering, may
not be something the justices are eager to have widely distributed.
True, the justices are all too often subjected to oral arguments by lawyers who have no more business
in an appellate courtroom than in a surgical operating theater, and their occasional impatience with
counsel may only be an indication that they are human. But having to listen to all comers comes with
the territory, and the justices' verbal lapses are not necessarily limited to instances in which counsel fall
short of stellar performance.
Still, even if my hunch is right, the justices' concern with their image hardly seems sufficient to bar
public distribution of the preserved living word of the decision-making process at the pinnacle of the
third branch of government.
After all -- as we need to be reminded from time to time -- judges are not some sort of anointed
priesthood. They are government officials in a democratically based society founded on the premise that
government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed who, in turn, are impeded in
granting their informed consent if available records of relevant public government proceedings are kept
from then.
The public nature of the recorded court proceedings is the rub. No one seeks here to pry into judicial
confidentiality that is essential to sound decision making. Judges should be free to voice among
themselves all sort of legal approaches and theories that, after going through collegial analysis, may be
discarded and never see the light of day.
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But public court proceedings are another matter. Nor can it even be argued here (as is sometimes
done in opposition to those seeking video coverage) that taping oral arguments will inspire people to
dramatics. If nothing else, the U.S. Supreme Court in session is dramatic enough as it is.
More importantly, we deal here with a record that is already in existence and is routinely being made
by the court in every case. It is therefore truly difficult to see what conceivable harm can come from
people being able to listen to the arguments, as well as read them.
Finally, there is a touch of poetic justice afoot here. When it comes to cases in which non-judicial
branches of govenment seek to keep their proceedings secret, the Supreme Court displays an entirely
different attitude. Remember the Pentagon Papers case? Do take a look at it; it's reported as New York
Times Co. v. US., 403 US. 713 (1971). It's a "good read."
True, the precise question before the court had to do with prior restraint, rather than confidentiality
of government records as such. But to anyone acquainted with even the rudiments of American
constitutional law, the case is rich in subtext whose message is unmistakable: there is no such thing in
the United States of America as government records whose publication can be prevented unless there
are darn good reason for secrecy, such as national security.
Besides, wouldn't it be fun to listen to what the justices had to say from the bench in 1971, when the
executive branch tried to keep its proceedings from widespread distribution by the press?
And so, the justices may do well to ponder the wisdom of the proverb that turnabout is fair play.
Having elevated freedom of speech and of the press virtually to a level of secular religion in this
country, it ill lies in their mouth -- as we lawyers are wont to say -- to argue that what is a
straightforward constitutional imperative for the other two branches of government is anathema to them.
Copyright 1993 Legal Communications, LTD
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TALES OF THE COURT // MARSHALL'S PAPERS CREATE SUPREME STIR //
JUSTICES TILTED AT COURT'S WINDMILLS
USA Today
May 27, 1993
Tony Mauro
"Things are so hush-hush around here," Thurgood Marshall wrote to a friend about the Supreme
Court in 1986.
Soon, Marshall promised mischievously, "I will let them have it."
Marshall was writing at the time about a controversial speech he planned to give about the
bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.
But the late Supreme Court justice could just as well have been describing what he has done from the
grave this week with the posthumous release of a lifetime's worth of papers at the Library of Congress.
The 173,000 documents - which reveal secret deliberations on cases as recent as two years ago - have
caused an uproar at the court, which prizes its privacy like no other Washington institution except,
perhaps, the CIA.
Marshall's friends and family are outraged. They insist that he never intended to breach the court's
secrecy with release of his papers so soon after his Jan. 24 death.
But Marshall also had an impish "let them have it" streak - amply displayed by the papers - that lends
itself to the idea that Marshall is having a good chuckle from beyond the pale.
The Library of Congress officials who met with the justice in 1991 say, no matter what he told friends
and family, Marshall told them he wanted his papers released without restriction.
What Marshall probably didn't anticipate is that his death would come so soon, giving the papers far
more headline quality than they might have had five or 10 years hence.
"He may have believed his health would hold up longer," library official David Wigdor acknowledges.
"But I was at the meeting and he left no uncertainty about his intentions."
Wigdor presides over the usually quiet manuscript division of the library, upon which dozens of
journalists, lawyers and scholars have descended this week.
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What they have found is the paper trail of a justice who gleefully tilted against court windmills and
conspired to deflate its stuffy image.
"I do not care to ride in a station wagon attired in white tux and tails," was Marshall's scribbled
response in 1973 to a detailed memo from colleague Potter Stewart setting forth the rules for use of the
court's sole chauffeured limousine.
In 1986, Marshall sent around a memo reminding justices about a suggestion he had made earlier for
a change in court procedure. "As usual, I have heard nothing from anybody," Marshall wrote grumpily.
A group of law clerks petitioned Chief Justice William Rehnquist in 1988, questioning the
appropriateness of the annual court-sponsored Christmas party because some court employees "may be
offended."
Marshall appeared from the files to be the only justice who agreed with the clerks, telling Rehnquist,
"As usual, I will not participate (in the party). I still prefer to keep church and state apart." The party
took place anyway on Dec. 16.
Also clear from the Marshall papers: The era of the paperless office has not dawned at the nation's
highest court. A ceaseless flow of paper circulates among the chambers of the nine justices, nailing down
lunch dates, chipping in for wedding gifts to the justices' children, as well as discussing cases.
In 1986, a court official even polled the justices on how they wished to spell the word "marijuana" in
future cases. Dozens of pieces of paper later, Henry Lind reported the result: four justices voted for a
"j," one favored an "h," three gave him their proxy, and one justice - possibly Marshall - didn't vote. The
result: The court came down firmly on the side of"j."
These rare inside peeks cause excruciating embarrassment to the justices.
With the case histories now public, lawyers in upcoming cases can target their arguments on justices
who recently expressed private concerns about related issues.
For example, files from the 1989 abortion case Webster vs. Reproductive Health Services show that
Sandra Day O'Connor was the critical fifth vote who kept the court from reversing Roe vs. Wade, the
1973 case that established abortion rights.
The papers also show Justice William Brennan tried persistently to keep the court's civil rights
decisions from being eroded by a new conservative majority before his 1990 retirement.
Also for the first time, the papers indicate why Justice Lewis Powell switched his vote in a 1986 case,
resulting in a decision that was a setback for homosexual rights. Powell wrote that it could not be a
"fundamental right" to engage in sexual conduct "that for centuries has been recognized as deviant."
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Carl Rowan, a Marshall friend for 40 years, says Marshall adhered religiously to the court's ethic of
confidentiality.
In a column published Wednesday, Rowan recounts how his plan to work jointly with Marshall on the
justice's autobiography fell through over the issue of confidentiality. Rowan says he told Marshall the
autobiography would have to contain details of specific cases he was involved in.
"I will not talk about other members of the court," Rowan quotes Marshall as saying. "And I will not
reveal any memos or documents relating to how the court reached certain decisions." The two returned
a $250,000 advance to the publisher.
Why was privacy so important to Marshall and the court?
"They simply can't have a free and open exchange of views if it's all going to be public knowledge,"
says Yale law professor Stephen Carter, a former Marshall law clerk. The glare of publicity, he says,
turns their thoughtful deliberations into signs of "waffling," Carter says.
But Pulitzer Prize-winning historian David Garrow, who is perusing the Marshall papers for a book
on abortion, disagrees: "Almost everything I've seen makes them look good."
Looking through the files of the court's most controversial cases suggests that the justices agonize
over every word and comma, mindful of the impact of their decisions.
"I have been struggling with these cases," Justice Byron White wrote his colleagues in 1972 about the
pending Roe vs. Wade decision on abortion. Ultimately, White opposed abortion rights.
Warren Burger, then chiefjustice, wrote that he had "a great many problems" with the case as well.
"Perhaps," he sniffed, "my problem arises from the mediocre to poor help from counsel" who argued
the case.
In the end, Burger voted in favor of abortion rights, joining Harry Blackmun who also described the
case as "both difficult and elusive" in a memo included in the Marshall papers.
Blackmun added, "I fear what the headlines will be."
Copyright 1993 Gannett Company, Inc.
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HIGH COURT DISPLAYS OBSESSIVE CONCERN, ANGUISH OVER PRIVACY
The Houston Chronicle
May 30, 1993
Linda Greenhouse; New York Times
WASIINGTON -- Of course judges are human.
Of course they change their minds, say things they later regret, enter into tactical alliances, make
timely compromises.
What is notable about Justice Thurgood Marshall's papers, released by the Library of Congress and
spread before the public in newspaper accounts last week, is not that his Supreme Court files reveal all
this, as other justices' papers have documented before.
The most striking and, at least on the surface, puzzling aspect of the affair is the evident anger and
anguish of the court over the disclosures.
The material that has come to light -- the justices' memorandums and working papers, drafts of
opinions, even churlish passages that were edited out of final versions -- includes little if anything to
embarrass the court.
What comes through most clearly is the collective seriousness of purpose the justices bring to their
work, in addition to an almost ritual politeness, a solicitude for one another's feelings extending to
whether anyone would object to the gift shop stocking copies of the chief justice's book about the court.
By lashing out at the library with a threat to withhold future donations of justices' papers, the court
displayed once again its deep, almost obsessive concern for secrecy.
It is a concern driven in part by the natural desire of many organizations to shield their internal
workings from public view, whether the subject is the pay of top executives, the decisions of an
academic tenure committee, or editing in a newsroom.
But there is something else at work here: a belief among judges that to strip any court of its mystique
is also inevitably to strip it of some of its authority and legitimacy.
"The court's afraid of being demystified," said Dennis J. Hutchinson, a professor of the University of
Chicago Law School.
"The myth of reasoned detachment is one the court clings to ferociously. They're afraid it's the myth
or nothing, that they'll be seen as either apostles of principled deliberation or as scoundrels. " But
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Hutchinson, a former Supreme Court law clerk who is now working on a biography of Justice Byron
R. White, said that "the justices have less to fear than they think. "
While the public is able to accept and appreciate a court composed of "a variety of earnest people, of
uneven abilities, wrestling with intractable problems in a very artificial environment," he said, the justices'
own "self-imposed isolation" makes it difficult for them to believe that to be the case.
"They're victims of an image they never test," Hutchinson said. "They need reality checks, and they
never get them. "
The court has spoken recently and powerfully of the need to safeguard its claim to public acceptance
of its awesome constitutional power to thwart the will of democratically elected legislatures. The theme
was central to the court's decision last June to reaffirm the constitutional right to abortion.
The opinion written jointly by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy and David H.
Souter, noting that the court could not buy or coerce obedience, said the court's power lay "in its
legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the
judiciary as fit to determine what the nation's law means and to declare what it demands. " The opinion
added: "The court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on
the terms the court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and
political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the court is obliged to
make. "
The sense that the court is and must be seen as greater than the sum of its parts, as something other
than a collection of individuals who once had the political connections necessary to get powerful jobs,
pervades the court's institutional life.
The court makes available transcripts of its oral arguments, but the justices asking the questions are
not identified by name.
The inherent fiction is that the questions come from "The Court," not individuals.
And it is part of the same perspective that justices are to be seen as sure-footed rather than hesitant
and uncertain, as early drafts of opinions can show them to be.
"I'm not sure you want the world to see your evolving thoughts evolve," said Stephen J.Wermiel, a
professor at the Georgia State College of Law who is writing an authorized biography of Justice William
J. Brennan Jr.
"You want the freedom to engage in your own written dialogue without necessarily knowing how it's
going to come out," Wermiel said.
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Painful to the court is that Marshall's files, made public at his death and barely 18 months after he left
the court, include not just his own work but the work-in-progress of every other justice with whom he
served.
Supreme Court justices and other appellate judges do not work alone; every majority opinion reflects
at least some measure of collective effort, so any justice's files are a window on the court as a whole.
"You need that free give and take on a collegial court," said Chief Judge Abner J. Mikva of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. "Collegiality and civility are already tested, and
they will be tested even more if you couldn't retreat from a first draft. " Mikva, a former Supreme Court
law clerk, is trying to persuade other judges to preserve records so they can become available to the
public.
"Historically, it's nice to know that judges have tempers and human frailties, but it doesn't help the
civility of the institution to have it come out contemporaneously," he said.
Copyright 1993 The Houston Chronicle Publishing Company
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WHAT THE NATION NEEDS IS SUPREME COURT TV
The Plain Dealer
January 12, 1997
Tom Brazaitis
What a shame it is that all but a lucky few Americans were not able to see last Wednesday's session
of the U.S. Supreme Court, because it was truly historic.
For two hours that morning, the high court heard arguments and posed tough questions on an issue
of interest to every one of us - physician-assisted suicide.
If you were not one of the select few who got to observe this debate over the so-called "right to die,"
neither was I - and I was there to cover it.
The courtroom at the heart of the marbled Supreme Court Building is relatively small and not
designed for the convenience of spectators. The justices and their clerks, the opposing lawyers and a
handful of reporters who regularly cover the court occupy the main portion of the room, along with
members of the public fortunate enough to gain admittance.
Seats for roughly 100 other reporters - those who show up only for the high-profile cases, such as the
one last week and tomorrow's oral arguments in the case William Jefferson Clinton vs. Paula Corbin
Jones - are crammed into three rows along one side of the courtroom behind massive stone pillars.
Those whose seats happen to be between pillars can peek through and see two, three or maybe even
four of the justices. My vantage point was such that I could see the back of the head of Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsberg, and then only if I leaned far to the left to peer around the pillar directly in front of me.
The other reporters and I who were banished to the media dungeon could hear the disembodied voices
of the lawyers and the justices, but could not see who was talking. Even when I leaned to catch a
glimpse of Justice Ginsberg, I could not tell from the back of her head whether it was she or the other
female justice, Sandra Day O'Connor, who was speaking.
Whenever one of the justices spoke (which was frequently because they interrupted the lawyers'
arguments on an average of every 30 seconds), a guard assigned to monitor us would listen for a while
until he thought he recognized the voice. Then he would mouth the name or hold up one to nine fingers
to specify the source of the voice.
Each reporter had a scorecard of sorts, listing the justices by number. When the guard held up eight
fingers, we consulted the card and saw it was Justice Ginsberg. Nine fingers meant Justice Steven
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Breyer, four meant Justice Antonin Scalia, one meant Chief Justice William Rehnquist, and so forth.
(For the record, not once did the guard hold up seven fingers, which would have signaled Justice
Clarence Thomas. That was because not once throughout the morning did Justice Thomas open his
mouth to speak.)
By this arcane and crude method, subject to error because the guard did not always correctly identify
the justice who was speaking, 100 reporters covered one of the most important Supreme Court
arguments of our time.
I am not complaining for myself or the other reporters because we, at least, were in the vicinity of
history being made, and we could hear the arguments and take notes (no tape recorders allowed). But
this was a life-and-death debate that all Americans should have been able to hear and see.
Scores of people waited long hours in freezing cold weather to claim the courtroom seats set aside
for the public. The Associated Press reported that Gail Van Norman, a Seattle anesthesiologist, showed
up at 4:30 p.m. Tuesday, 17 hours before the public was allowed in, to be first in line.
"These cases could really change the face of the doctor-patient relationship," she said.
With such a cloak of secrecy guarding the third branch of government, no wonder very few Americans
can name even two or three of the justices. No wonder the public has so little understanding of what
the high court does.
Why is it that in an age of "government in the sunshine," the judicial branch remains largely in the
shadows? The answer is that the Supreme Court has a policy that as long as even one justice objects to
cameras in the courtroom, none will be allowed, and Justice David Souter, for one, has said cameras
will enter over his dead body.
The lifetime appointments granted to the justices carry with them an extra responsibility to be
accountable to the people who are expected to follow their dictates.
Step aside, Justice Souter. It is high time the high court opened its doors to all Americans.
Copyright 1997 Plain Dealer Publishing Co.
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SOUTER SIGNALS HE'S NOT READY FOR PRIME TIME;
RECENT COMMENTS SUGGESTS THE SUPREME COURT REMAINS A LONG WAY
FROM WEAKENING ITS RESOLVE AGAINST CAMERAS
The Recorder
April 16, 1996
Tony Mauro
Advocates for broadcast coverage of the Supreme Court have always banked on a youth movement
to get the cameras rolling.
The theory goes that sooner or later, new, younger justices will come on board who grew up with less
fear of the medium than their stubborn elders. Eventually, these newer justices would look around,
wonder what all the fuss was about, and let the cameras in.
Waiting for court turnover has always seemed like a pretty passive strategy, like waiting for the sun
to melt the glaciers until the dinosaurs drown. And late last month, Justice David Souter, 56, made it
clear the dinosaurs are still alive and kicking. The younger generation of justices, or at least some of
them, seem to have learned little about the preeminent information medium of the century, and
apparently couldn't care less about the public's interest in what goes on at the court. (The Recorder is
affiliated with Court TV.)
As Souter, almost precisely echoing a comment attributed to the late Warren Burger decades ago, told
a House budget subcommittee: "I think the case [against cameras] is so strong that I can tell you that
the day you see a camera coming into our courtroom, it's going to roll over my dead body." It was
clearly something Souter has been eager to say for a while, and he elaborated by recalling the roots of
his sentiment as a state judge in New Hampshire. Whenever broadcasters were covering a proceeding
before him, Souter said, "the cameras certainly affected my behavior," because he knew that his
questions would be taken "totally out of context on the 6 o'clock news."
A congressman tried to interrupt, but Souter was on a roll, well aware that CSPAN cameras were
broadcasting his every word. Souter was apparently glad to exploit the medium he was trashing, when
it suited him.
"I think the people of the United States ought to be entitled to know about what at least I believe,"
said Souter. "That in fact this judiciary is an institution which is not a political institution. The whole
point is not to be one. Nor is it, on the other hand, part of the entertainment industry in the United
States. It's a place where, perhaps in a frequently dull and tedious way, a kind of plodding process is
supposed to go on of trying in the most impartial way that human beings are capable of to reach truth
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about some fact and to dispose of it in a reasoned way. And I am very happy to have the judiciary an
exception to televised scrutiny."
Souter said he felt the entire judiciary ought to remain outside the camera's eye.
The Judicial Conference recently voted to grant federal appeals courts discretion in permitting
broadcast coverage; both the Second and the Ninth circuits promptly voted to do so.
KENNEDY'S SERIOUS RESERVATIONS
In fairness to Souter, he wasn't the only justice younger than 60 to speak out against cameras in the
high court. He just did it more dramatically.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, who turns 60 in July, also testified before the budget committee, playing
the enlightened teacher to the inquiring members of Congress. He spoke of habeas corpus reform,
which he said was urgently needed. On the court's workload, he said the justices had determined that
writing 100 opinions a term was about "optimal," and that erring on the low side -- which the justices
are doing big-time this term -- was to be preferred.
On cameras, Kennedy began with a fairly reasoned response to Rep. Harold Rogers, R-Ky. "I think
it would be mistake to make major policy based on one case," Kennedy said, referring to the O.J.
Simpson trial. "Television is part of the environment that we live in; it's difficult to excise. You can
make the argument that the most rational, the most dispassionate, the most orderly presentation of the
issue is in the courtroom, and it is the outside coverage that's really the problem. And in a way it seems
somewhat perverse to exclude the television from the area in which the most orderly presentation of the
evidence takes place."
But then Kennedy veered back. "Without trying to seem -- what's a nice word for hypocritical --
inconsistent -- I have serious reservations about allowing the camera into our own proceedings."
Kennedy said that as long as any other justice objects to cameras, he will join them.
Kennedy also said he is against cameras at the Supreme Court partly for symbolic reasons. "It
underscores for the public that we are different from the other branches. We operate on a different time
line, a different chronology. We speak a different grammar," Kennedy said. "And by insisting that we
perform our functions in a way that we've historically performed it, without the intrusive commentary
that follows the camera and without the potential for changing the behavior of the judges and the
attorneys that appear before us, I think there is a very strong case for continuing to exclude the cameras
from our courtroom."
Souter and Kennedy both were far less hostile to the idea of cameras when they were questioned at
their confirmation hearings. Souter's classic line on cameras at his hearing was, "I am of two minds, in
one respect."
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At his confirmation he was willing to acknowledge potential educational value in camera access but,
for now, Souter is of one mind on the issue.
Justice John Paul Stevens might be the only justice left who favors cameras. Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen Breyer seem lukewarm at best. The number of supporters seems to be going down, not up.
And maybe Kennedy is onto the reason. Once the justices get to the court, they get caught up in the
aura and the tradition, and the notion that the court is different from everything else in Washington.
And they decide: We must keep cameras out because we have always done it that way. Someday, that
mule-headed argument will die. But thanks to Souter and Kennedy the date of its demise seems ever
further away.
Copyright 1996 American Lawyer Media, L.P.
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News Media Coverage of the United States Supreme Court
Stephen J. Wermiel
(forthcoming, St. Louis University Law Journal)
When the Conference of Supreme Courts of the Americas met in Washington, D.C., in October
1995, Justice Stephen G. Breyer of the United States Supreme Court outlined five main ingredients that
preserve judicial independence in the United States.2 Each of the five elements could well be the focus
of a separate conference. This essay will only elaborate on the fifth factor, which Justice Breyer
described as "assuring the efficacy of judicial decisions."'
The "efficacy" of which Justice Breyer spoke depends in large measure on public respect for and
compliance with the decisions of the courts. This essay will argue at a theoretical level that news media
coverage of the United States Supreme Court, by creating an informed public that extends beyond the
organized bar, is an essential element in the goal of guaranteeing respect for the United States Supreme
Court and of fostering compliance with its decisions, hallmarks of judicial independence. This may be
an unintended consequence of news media coverage, since the role of reporters is to get their stories,
not to promote judicial independence. Yet I hope to demonstrate that while the courts and the news
media have different goals and objectives in their institutional relationship, in a democratic society it is
generally in the national interest and in the judiciary's interest to have responsible press coverage.
This essay will then examine at a practical level ways in which the United States Supreme Court
should and does facilitate coverage by the news media. Exploration of these practical issues is not
intended to find ways to enlist the news media in improving the image of the courts but rather to help
ease the barriers to a responsible press from which both the judiciary and the press clearly benefit.
This discussion is limited to news media coverage at the level of the Supreme Court. While there
2 The five factors are described in Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United
States, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 989 (1996). The article describes the five factors as:
First, the constitutional protections that judges in the United States have; second, the
independent administration of the judiciary by the judiciary; third, judicial disciplinary
authority over the misconduct of judges; fourth, the manner in which we address conflicts of
interest; and finally, how we assure that the judge's decisions are effective.
Id. at 989.
'Id. at 994.
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is much interest in the broader area of relations between the news media and courts generally, the issues
and concerns facing other courts differ in terms of public awareness, visibility, the types of legal
proceedings and the available news media resources.
The value of the United States experience to other countries depends on many variables in
judicial systems, and there is much for the United States to learn, as well, from the relationship between
the news media and the Supreme Courts of other nations. This essay is intended to be part of just such
an exchange of ideas.
I.
A.
Let me begin with a note about judicial independence. Residents of the United States have come
to expect, indeed to rely on the independence of the Supreme Court. It is the quality that, perhaps more
than any other, assures the Court its credibility and public respect. This cherished independence is not
merely the result of the guarantee of life tenure in Article II of the United States Constitution.' It is the
result of an enduring public perception that as a government institution, the Supreme Court works, that
it reaches reasoned and thoughtful decisions in an adequately explained and appropriately detached
manner.
A clear illustration of this judicial independence at work -- the most recent of many examples
-- is the case of Clinton v. Jones,6 decided in May 1997. The Supreme Court, rejecting the position of
President Bill Clinton, ruled unanimously that the United States Constitution does not grant the
President of the United States complete immunity from civil lawsuits for damages arising from events
that occurred before the President took office. Among the nine Supreme Court Justices who ruled
against the position of President Bill Clinton were Justices Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, both
nominated to the Supreme Court by President Clinton.7 They were able to vote against the position of
the President who appointed them without fear of reprisal or recrimination. Perhaps a more profound
example is the case of United States v. Nixon9 in which the Supreme Court, by an 8-0 vote, ordered the
late President Richard Nixon to turn over to prosecutors secret tape recordings of conversations with
4 For one recent discussion, see Russell R. Wheeler, Las Relaciones Entre la Prensay el
Poder Judicial en Los Estados Unidos, PRENSA Y JUSTICIA 19 (1996) (published by Junta Federal de
Cortes y Superiores Tribunales de Justicia de las Provincias Argentinas).
5 Article III says that Judges of the federal system "shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour [sic]."
6 117 S.Ct. 1636 (1997).
Justice Ginsburg was appointed in 1993. Justice Breyer was appointed in 1994.
9418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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his advisers and staff. The late Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justices Harry A. Blackmun and
Lewis F. Powell, all appointed by President Nixon, voted to reject the President's claim that the
executive privilege of his office protected the tapes; indeed, Chief Justice Burger was the principal
author of the decision.
These votes and countless other examples serve to reassure a democratic society that the
Supreme Court, while never completely removed from the political process, is not directly influenced
by political pressures the way other branches of government are. But the purpose of this essay is not
to extol the value ofjudicial independence, but to explicate the part that news media coverage of the
Supreme Court plays in evaluating and, perhaps, expanding public awareness of judicial independence.
B.
To facilitate understanding of how the news media covers the Supreme Court, a few basic facts are
necessary about how the Supreme Court operates. This information is surely not new to most listeners
or readers, but it may help to promote a common basis of understanding.
Each year, about 6,700 litigants who have lost in the courts below ask the Supreme Court to
decide their cases. These litigants seek review of their decisions in the lower federal courts, or in the
state courts involving matters of the United States Constitution or federal laws. The Court has nearly
total discretion to choose which of these 6,700 cases it wants to decide. For the last few years the Court
has selected about 80 to 90 cases a year. For all of the other cases, the last decision of the lower court
stands.
There are no strict rules that the Court must follow in selecting the very few cases to decide out
of the many petitions presented to it. Generally, however, the Justices decide cases that involve
important legal issues that society needs to have settled. These often include legal issues that have arisen
in more than one federal court of appeals and that have been decided in different, conflicting ways. The
Court does not see its primary role as correcting injustices that may have occurred in other courts. The
principal function for the Supreme Court is to resolve or clarify important legal doctrines for other
courts to apply in future cases.
It is also important to remember that the Supreme Court operates in a common law system as
an appellate court that does not determine the facts in the cases it decides. The Supreme Court does not
hear witnesses or examine evidence. Its job is to decide whether the lower courts properly applied the
law to the facts as determined in the lower courts.
The Supreme Court term begins each year on the first Monday in October. Between October
and the end of April, the Justices convene in seven two-week sessions in which they hear the lawyers
argue their cases in the courtroom for three days each week. Most cases are allocated one hour, with
each side having 30 minutes to argue. Before the oral arguments the Justices have also read the written
arguments, or briefs, submitted by the lawyers. The Justices frequently engage in very active questioning
of the lawyers during the one-hour argument, trying to understand the full dimensions of the issues in
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the cases.
The Supreme Court reaches its decisions in secret meetings that are held during the two-week
argument sessions. The decisions are announced exclusively in the form of written "opinions," which
explain the reasoning of the Court. A decision may include an opinion for the Court, written by one of
the Justices in the majority, and may also include one or more "concurring opinions" by Justices who
agree with the decision but have a different view of the reasons for it, and "dissenting opinions" by
Justices who disagree with the Court's result. The Court begins slowly issuing these written decisions
in November and December, and then the pace picks up rapidly in May as the term nears an end usually
by late June. These written opinions may be only a few pages or may be very lengthy, over 100 pages.
The Court tries to announce all of its decisions from an October-to-June term during that same
period and then takes a break from arguments and decisions for the Summer months of July, August and
September. During all of this period, however, the Court continues to receive a steady flow of new
cases and, except during the Summer recess, continues to announce which cases it will decide.
II.
It is axiomatic in the United States that the Supreme Court has no direct power of enforcement
for its rulings and depends upon the acceptance of its decisions by the people. The Supreme Court has
observed:
As Americans of each succeeding generation are rightly told, the Court cannot buy support for
its decisions by spending money and, except to a minor degree, it cannot independently coerce
obedience to its decrees. The Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance
and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine
what the Nation's law means and to declare what it demands."
In explaining this concern two years ago, Justice Breyer said, "An orderly society, in which people
follow the rulings of courts as a matter of course, and in which resistance to a valid court order is
considered unacceptable behavior which most people would not countenance, is the core assurance"1 2
required for effective judicial decision making.
There is something of a paradox inherent in this goal, however. The difficult question is how to
achieve and maintain respect for an institution -- the Supreme Court -- that speaks only in written
opinions that are unlikely to be read by more than a minuscule percentage of even well-educated citizens
and that communicates in a terminology that most people would not be able to understand even if they
had the chance to try. "Even opinions that are clear and tight will have a limited audience: the legal
profession and the press," United States Supreme Court Justice Ginsburg observed in a speech on the
" Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
12 Breyer, supra note 1, at 996.
332
role of the news media in reporting on the Supreme Court.14 There is no doubt that the credibility of the
institution comes at least in part from the Supreme Court's independence, but fostering the public's
understanding of that independence is not a regular part of the Court's daily routine.
One significant answer to this dilemma is that the public learns of the actions of the United
States Supreme Court through the news media. Said Justice Ginsburg, "Mass media reporters are the
people in fact responsible for translating what courts write into a form the public can digest."" This
transmission of information, on balance, helps to maintain the respect that the Supreme Court enjoys
in the democratic system of governance. U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Gilbert S. Merritt,' 6 discussing
not just the Supreme Court but the federal courts in general, made this point emphatically:
The judiciary, critical and uncooperative as we often are, recognizes that without the support
of the media translating to the American public what the judiciary is all about, that we are not
going to maintain for long a system of life tenure and no term limits. Additionally, we would not
be able to maintain a system by which judges can be relatively free, compared to elected
officials, of temporary public opinion.
Most judges do not make this observation lightly about the important role of the news media,
for commentators have found much to debate and even to criticize about the focus and quality
of news media reporting on the Supreme Court." Indeed, some judges acknowledge this
14 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Communicating and Commenting on the Court ' Work, 83 GEo.
L.J. 2119, 2121 (1995). For a more recent discussion, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Informing the
Public About the US. Supreme Court's Work, 29 Loy. U. CI. L.J. 275 (1998).
16 The Honorable Gilbert S. Merritt is a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit and served as chief judge until January 1997.
17 Gilbert S. Merritt, Courts, Media and the Press, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 505, 514 (1997).
" For relatively recent discussions of the relationship between the news media and the
Supreme Court, see generally, Merritt, Courts, Media and the Press, supra note 16 (1997);
BARRETT McGuRN, AMERICA'S COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PEOPLE (1997); Linda
Greenhouse, Telling the Court's Story: Justice and Journalism at the Supreme Court, 105 YALE
L.J. 1537 (1996); Ginsburg, Communicating and Commenting on the Court ' Work, supra note 13
(1995); RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS (1994);
Jerome O'Callaghan and James 0. Dukes, Media Coverage of the Supreme Court ' Caseload, 69
JOURNALISM Q. 195 (1992); Elliot E. Slotnick, Media coverage of Supreme Court decision making:
problems and prospects, 75 JUDICATURE 128 (1991); and Henry J. Reske, At Close Range: A
Reporter at the Supreme Court, A.B.A. J. May 1991, 66 (1991).
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important role for the news media only in the most practical terms that sound almost like a quid-
pro-quo. Suggesting that the relationship between the Supreme Court and the news media
operates as more of a two-way street in which there is much to gain and lose on both sides, the
late United States Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan Jr. said:
The press needs the Court, if only or the simple reason that the Court is the ultimate guardian
of the constitutional rights that support the press. And the Court has a concomitant need for the press,
because through the press the Court receives the tacit and accumulated experience of the nation, and
-- because the judgments of the Court ought also to instruct and to inspire -- the Court needs the
medium of the press to fulfill this task.' 9
Despite criticisms and caveats, when it comes to the United States Supreme Court, news media
reporting undoubtedly helps to create an informed public, an admittedly very small but vitally important
constituency for obedience to even the most controversial and widely criticized rulings of the Court.
This informed public may remain a minuscule segment of society, for many of the residents of the United
States still know little about the Supreme Court. Yet this small constituency is surely made up of leaders
and opinion-shapers who make respect for the Supreme Court respectable and who make the social
costs of disregarding Supreme Court decisions too great.
In my view, even reporting that focuses too much on the personalities of the justices or that too
heavily emphasizes the view of the Court as a political institution or that misinterprets the legal
significance of the Court's actions or that pays too much attention to the results of cases and too little
to the process and reasoning, adds to public understanding of and, ultimately, to public respect for the
Supreme Court.2
Let me clarify so as not to be misunderstood. It is not my purpose to argue that any news media
This subject has long fascinated political scientists and journalism analysts. For older
discussions, see for example, Ethan Katsh, The Supreme Court Beat: How Television Covers the
Supreme Court, 67 JUDICATURE 6 (1983); David Ericson, Newspaper Coverage of the Supreme
Court: A Case Study, 54 JOURNALISM Q. 604 (1977); Everette Dennis, Another Look at Press
Coverage of the Supreme Court, 20 VLL L. REV. 765 (1974); and Chester A. Newland, Press
Coverage of the United States Supreme Court, 19 WEST. POL. Q. 15 (1964).
19 William J. Brennan Jr., Why protect the press?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
January/February 1980, 59 (1980). This comment is taken from an address by Justice Brennan at the
dedication of the Samuel 1. Newhouse Law Center at Rutgers University in Newark, New Jersey.
Another version of the address appears at 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 173 (1979).
' For a contrary view, see the American Enterprise Institute Boyer Lecture, The Courts and
the Press, delivered by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia on Dec. 6, 1989. Excerpts of a
tape of the lecture are quoted in Slotnick, supra note 17, at 130.
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reporting on the Supreme Court, even bad reporting, is better than no reporting at all, Rather, it is my
view that there is a substantial amount of very good reporting about the Supreme Court. Moreover,
even reporting which a reader may fault for its emphasis or perspective still more often than not cannot
help but depict a reasonably accurate picture of a Supreme Court hard at work, engaged in the credible
resolution of tough legal questions, grappling with some of the most difficult issues of the day and
turning out decisions in a timely fashion. This portrayal is not a bad balance for the Supreme Court and
may be substantially better than the treatment of other government institutions by the news media.
Consider, for example, the criticisms by two political scientists who concluded several years ago
that the news media's selection of which cases to cover reflected a skewed view of the total caseload
of Supreme Court decisions.25 Writing in Journalism Quarterly, Jerome O'Callaghan and James 0.
Dukes said the news media gave a disproportionate amount of attention to civil rights and First
Amendment cases and not enough to economic and other issues.2 6 They concluded, "The data make it
clear that the media frequently neglect the Court's contribution to the development of many diverse
areas of American law. . .In this light, one can only conclude that the public's support of the Supreme
Court . . is based in large part on a misunderstanding of the vital work done by the Justices."27 But
this research seems to miss the import of its own conclusion. It is readily apparent that the cases selected
by the news media for coverage generally involve the most volatile emotional and controversial issues.
If the small core of public support for the Supreme Court is solid when focused on the volatile cases,
that support would likely go up, not down, if the Court's less emotional cases received a greater share
of attention from the media. If the Court's credibility can withstand news media scrutiny of the most
divisive cases, surely the Court's reputation can stand up to greater focus on lesser cases.
Several other disclaimers are necessary to place proper borders around the point I seek to make.
First, many judges and commentators are much less willing to make the same claims for the benefits of
news coverage when it comes to courts below the level of the Supreme Court. Criticism of the news
media has been even greater and recognition of any salutary effect substantially less when the discussion
turns to coverage of lower state and federal courts. Summing up the views of many of his judicial
colleagues, Judge Merritt said, "Many judges do not particularly like the media. They are skeptical and
cynical. The media tends to sensationalize and very much oversimplify the cases that they have seen in
the courts. The media doesn't deal well with the complexity of the situations and with the problems of
judicial process."2 8
25 O'Callaghan and Dukes, supra note 17.
26 id
27 Id. at 203.
28 Merritt, supra note 16, at 513. Some of this attitude may be attributed to the debate over
cameras in the courtrooms and their affect on criminal trials and juries, according to Judge Merritt.
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The problems that Judge Merritt identifies are hardly peculiar to the United States. At the 1995
Conference of the Supreme Courts of the Americas, responding to observations by Justice Breyer, two
Justices took a sharply different view of the news media's impact on judicial independence in their
countries. Josefina Calcano de Temeltas, First Vice-Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Venezuela,
said, "The news media also exert considerable pressure, to the extent that when a judge is preparing to
issue a ruling, the defendant has already been convicted by public opinion due to the pressure of the
news media (press, radio and television)." 29 Another commentator raised concerns about news media
coverage prejudicing judges and compromising their independence. "Extensive press and media
campaign can have an effect on judicial independence. A judge should do his utmost to not allow his
mind to be affected by what he has seen, heard or read outside the court," said Edward Zacca, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Jamaica."
A second disclaimer is that I am not arguing that it is the job of the news media to promote
public understanding of the Supreme Court or to protect and defend judicial independence. Virtually
all news reporters would eschew any such role, except to the extent that there is a good news story
involved. Enhancement ofjudicial independence in this country is simply a by-product of reporting about
the Supreme Court as a credible institution.
Finally, I am not suggesting that the Supreme Court would cease to function without the news
media to translate the Court's decisions for readers, listeners and viewers. No doubt the Court would
survive, carried along by public respect derived in part from the mystique that is a natural part of the
Court's secrecy and remoteness.
But what an healthy, even uplifting prospect it is to have the respect and credibility of a
government institution generated from openness and increased public understanding instead of
mystique. It is an awesome responsibility -- for the news media and for the Court. As Linda Greenhouse,
the longtime Supreme Court correspondent for the New York Times, has observed, "[I]t is sobering to
acknowledge the extent to which the courts and the country depend on the press for the public
understanding that is necessary for the health and, ultimately, the legitimacy of any institution in a
democratic society.""
III.
The discussion of news media coverage of the United States Supreme Court or of any other
29 Josefina Calcano de Temeltas, Commentary, 40 ST. Lotis U. L.J. 997, 998 (1996).
30 Edward Zacca, Commentary, 40 ST. Loius U. L.J. 1005, 1007 (1996).
31 Greenhouse, supra note 17, at 1538.
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Supreme Court involves a mixture of factors. These include analysis of institutional pressures and
motivations, as outlined above, and examination of very specific practical problems, as discussed below.
The purpose of examining practical concerns is not because precisely the same problems exist in the
other Supreme Courts of the Americas; surely the problems differ. But examination of the specific
problems that arise in the United States helps to create a fuller picture of the dynamic between the
Supreme Court and the news media. That dynamic, if fully explored, may in turn suggest lines of
resolution for problems that are not limited to the Supreme Court of any one nation.
If there is good reason for the United States Supreme Court to encourage news media coverage,
then it is logical to inquire what steps the Court may take to help facilitate reporting on decisions. In
this section, I draw heavily on my own experiences as Supreme Court correspondent for the Wall Street
Journal from 1979 to 1991.
During its nine-month session from October to June, the Supreme Court is covered by a regular,
more-or-less full-time press corps of up to 15 reporters. These reporters have cubicles in a ground-floor
press room adjacent to the Court's Public Information Office. As many as two dozen other reporters
may cover the Court regularly but are not there full-time. Several dozen additional reporters may cover
the Court from time-to-time, most of them assigned to papers that do not really want a steady Supreme
Court reporter but which occasionally want their own reporter's name and expertise on a story of
important local interest.
For the full-time reporters, the relationship with the Court has always been a strange mix of
accommodation on the one hand and remoteness and aloofness on the other. The Court accommodates
some basic needs of the news media, but is unwilling to consider other, even modest proposals or
complaints. Indeed, because any formal discussions among the Justices and any official voting are
conducted in closed session, even when the focus is about procedural reforms, at times the news media
does not even know whether their requests have been considered by the Court.
The late Chief Justice Burger was willing to hold occasional meetings with some of the regular
Supreme Court reporters, but the sessions were infrequent and did not often yield change. Still, the
meetings did provide an opportunity for "regulars" to raise concerns with the Chief Justice about
operating procedures at the Supreme Court that directly affect the news media. Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist has continued the practice with relatively little change.
There is little or no other formal contact between the Justices and the press corps. Some justices
follow a practice of allowing newcomers to the Supreme Court beat to pay a courtesy call to introduce
themselves. Some even allow an occasional return visit. There are episodic examples of individual
Justices being sufficiently well-acquainted with particular reporters to have an occasional lunch or cup
of coffee together. But the Justices rarely hold press conferences, and they never hold them to discuss
* * *35their decisions.
" Justice Ginsburg noted:
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What are the ways in which the Supreme Court accommodates the press corps, and in what
ways does the Court decline to make arrangements for the news media? Let me turn to those specifics.
The Court accommodates the news media by providing a press room with general work space
for reporters and cubicles for the handful of regulars. In the rooms adjacent to and nearby the press
room, the Court has also established an Office of Public Information with a small, very able professional
staff to handle press inquiries as well as some public queries."
Also located in the Public Information Office is a separate set of about one-third of the roughly
6,700 petitions upon which the Supreme Court acts each year and of the briefs filed in the 90 cases in
which the Court hears arguments each term.
The Supreme Court also makes special provision for the news media by setting aside a section
of seating in the courtroom for the use of reporters who cover the announcements of decisions and the
oral arguments. When seats are in big demand for an important argument, the Public Information Office
allocates the press seats. And although the Court does not allow television or radio broadcasts of its
arguments, the Justices have allowed network artists to bring their big drawing pads into the courtroom
so that they may sketch oral argument scenes or Justices announcing their decisions.
There are other accommodations, as well. The Public Information Office makes available to the
news media the Court's "conference lists," the roster of petitions available for consideration by the
Justices at their weekly closed-door conference where they vote on which cases to hear and which to
deny review. The availability of this list does not tell the press which cases will be granted and which
denied, but it does give the news media access to the same pool of cases which the Court is considering
in a particular week. This enables the reporters to look through the list in advance and identify and
prepare notes on cases that are of interest either because they expect the Court to grant review or
because they have news value even if the Court denies review.
News reporting on this aspect of the Court's process is sometimes tricky and controversial. The
Supreme Court operates on what is known as the "Rule of Four," meaning only four Justices need vote
to grant review to a case even though a majority is five. When the Court denies review, it is long-
Legend has it that Justices, even Chief Justices, once took phone calls from some members
of the press on decision days, to explain nuances of complex cases -- not for quotation of
course, merely to clarify potential ambiguities. That kind of conversation, I can say with
some confidence, is destined to remain legendary.
Ginsburg, supra note 13, at 2122 (footnote omitted).
36 Public Information Officer Toni House is a former newspaper reporter and is well-
regarded by the Supreme Court press corps.
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accepted wisdom that the denial is not a decision on the merits and has no Supreme Court precedential
value. As the Justices often remind us, a denial simply means there were not four Justices who, for
whatever reason, wanted the Court to decide the particular case.39
This is a difficult concept for some reporters, especially those who do not regularly cover the
Supreme Court. Thus it is not uncommon to hear reports on radio and television or to read them in print
that the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's ruling or ruled against this group or that interest when
the Court simply denied review to a petition. Justice Ginsburg has complained, "Still too often, in my
view, the press overstates the significance of an order denying review. Headlines, particularly, may be
as misleading as they are eye-catching." 40
The Public Information Officer, who does not as a general rule explain the Court's actions or
comment on the decisions, occasionally advises a reporter that a story may have overstated the
significance of a denial of review. But this is one of the very few ways in which the Public Information
Officer discusses the substance of the Court's work. For the most part, the office serves as an important
conduit of information -- handing out copies of decisions to the news media as they are announced in
the courtroom, distributing the conference lists of cases to be considered by the Justices, maintaining
the shelves of petitions and briefs, sometimes distributing copies of Justices' speeches, advising the press
about the Court's schedule and announcing retirements when they occur.
There is no one at the Supreme Court who explains the decisions or comments on them. This
is not a problem at all for the reporters who regularly cover the Court, typically they will have read some
of the briefs and prepared themselves to deal with the issues raised in a case. A number of the regulars
also have law degrees, although most eschew the view that formal legal training is a prerequisite for the
job. For the dozens of reporters who cover the Court much less frequently, there is less opportunity to
prepare and often less familiarity with the issues or with the law generally. These reporters sometimes
turn to law professors or lawyers involved in the cases for explanation or comment, but the reporters'
task of translating the legal terminology is a difficult one.
Indeed, even for the regular reporters, with or without legal training, the task of quickly
digesting the opinions in time to meet daily news deadlines is formidable at best. About 25 years ago,
the Court began preparing the syllabus for the decision in advance and releasing it with the opinion to
provide a summary of the Court's actions. Individual Justices have also encouraged the development
of a publication entitled Preview. Published by the American Bar Association Division for Public
Education and other supporting groups, Preview contains discussions of the legal questions in pending
cases written by law professors in terminology intended to simplify the issues. Preview is a very
39 The classic formulation of this view belongs to Justice Felix Frankfurter. Maryland v.
Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917-919 (1950).
40 Ginsburg, supra note 13, at 2123.
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worthwhile effort, made available to reporters before the scheduled oral argument in a case. As a
resource, it can provide valuable insight into the legal issues in a case and their potential significance,
both for the law and for public policy. Justice Ginsburg says she even refers to Preview on occasion to
help her decide how much time to set aside for review of the briefs in a case or whether to research a
particular issue in a case.4 '
The absence of anyone to comment on or explain the Court's decisions is not a topic of major
concern in the Supreme Court press corps, perhaps because it is such a well-settled practice. But there
are small numbers of courts where information officers do try to explain the Court's actions or where
a judge will occasionally conduct an off-the-record briefing to answer questions about a case. Public
information officers at some courts are occasionally empowered to issue press releases announcing and,
of necessity, summarizing decisions for the news media. The argument against having judges or court
personnel explain decisions off the bench is an obvious one -- the precedent is the decision, itself, and
off-the-bench comments create the danger of lawyers citing the explanations which may differ somewhat
from the decisions. Another obvious problem in an appellate court is that the judge who is speaking may
not be accurately representing the views of the other judges who joined an opinion. The practice of
speaking only through the published decisions is well-settled in the Supreme Court, but the occasional
problem of whether anyone officially connected to the Court should explain the Court's actions to
reporters who need help, and if so, who that person should be, is likely to remain unsettled.
Behind the functions of the Public Information Office, there are numerous points of contention
about the relationship between the Court and the news media.
A significant and recurring concern involves the Court's release of its decisions. Justices
traditionally operate according to the view that if an opinion is ready to be announced, it should proceed
as soon as possible. This makes good sense, and that is why the Court more than two decades ago
abandoned its practice of announcing decisions only on Monday of the week they were ready for
announcement. The problem remains, however, that in May and June, as the Justices prepare for their
Summer recess, the Supreme Court typically releases about half of its decisions for the entire term,
which runs from October to late June. There are still many days when numerous, voluminous important
decisions are released on the same day. As one account has recalled, on the last day of the October
Term 1987 on June 29, 1988, the Justices "filled 446 pages" of the official Supreme Court reports of
their opinions with nine decisions in a single day.43
For years, the Supreme Court press corps has asked the Court to spread the decisions out in a
more measured way in May and June so that the news media has more days on which to digest the
opinions and more newspaper space or air time to devote to the reporting. The Court has been unwilling
41 Ginsburg, supra note 13 , at 2124.
43 Greenhouse, supra note 17, at 1558.
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to further modify its practice, apparently failing to consider the possibility that it might be in the Court's
interest, as well as in the news media's interest, to have more time and space available to reporting the
decisions. The Court presumably would benefit from having the decisions explained in greater depth
with more time for the reporters to digest them. This would almost certainly improve the quality of the
reporting to the public.
There are other differences of opinion between the Justices and the press corps, having less to
do with the Court's decisions and more to do with the Justices, themselves. The news media and the
Justices have long been at odds about reporting on the health of the Justices. Journalists believe it is part
of their job to hold the Justices accountable for their performance, and inability to be on the bench due
to illness is a leading focus of this concern. The Justices are more concerned with protecting their
privacy and, for the most part, resist any effort to systematically report about their health, even when
a problem is severe enough to necessitate hospitalization. The Public Information Office is caught in the
middle, able to report only those medical concerns that are authorized by the individual Justices. On
matters of this kind, the Justices operate as nine separate, independent entities; there is no institutional
policy that requires disclosure of medical problems. An unfortunate side effect is that some in the news
media speculate regularly about health problems of the Justices and chase rumors of possible
retirements. If these rumors were to be believed, just to pick one example, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
would have retired from the Supreme Court because of ill health nearly nine years ago. Instead, she is
still an active member of the Court. One cannot help but wonder whether the loss of privacy that might
result from a regular policy of confirming the hospitalization of Justices might be less intrusive than the
public speculation and rumors about their health.
The pattern is similar with speeches by the Justices. The news media is not routinely informed
when a Justice is giving a speech, unless that individual decides to release a text or notify the Public
Information Office. Again, the Justices are not particularly looking for press coverage of their off-the-
bench appearances and are far more comfortable speaking if there are no reporters or television cameras
present. For some Justices, this is so because they want to be able to use the same speech more than
once, for example with commencement addresses. For some it is because they wish to preserve their
relative anonymity. For still others, they are able to speak more freely and candidly if they do not need
to worry about dissemination of their remarks beyond a small audience. Again, no institutional policy
exists and it is doubtful than any policy could operate effectively since the Justices govern themselves
individually on these issues.
A final concern of more recent vintage is the timing of the announcement of which cases have
been granted review by the Justices. Although this issue is unique to the practices of the United States
Supreme Court, it is one of the latest additions to the fabric of the relationship that is the focus of this
essay. For the last few decades, the Court has voted on which cases to hear at a closed-door Friday
morning conference attended only by the Justices, themselves. The results of that discussion were
traditionally announced, along with the list of cases to which review was denied, on Monday mornings
when the Court took the bench to hear oral arguments. In the last few years, this practice has changed.
Throughout much of the fall the Justices have begun to announce the list of granted cases on Friday
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afternoon when their conference ends and to save the list of denied cases for Monday morning. This
change in practice started because the Court was not filling up its argument calendar. In the days when
the Justices were hearing 150 cases in a Term, the petitions were granted far enough in advance to allow
the parties to meet the 90-day briefing schedule spelled out in the Supreme Court's Rules. This
procedure also allowed the Clerk of the Court sufficient time to distribute the briefs for perusal by the
Justices and their law clerks before the case was argued.
As the number of argued cases dwindled to 100 and then fell below that in recent years,
however, the Justices found that cases granted review during some fall and winter months would not
be fully briefed in time to fill holes in the argument calendar in the period from January through April.
Making the announcement that a case was granted on Friday afternoon instead of Monday morning
during some fall months advanced the briefing schedule by three days. This seemingly brief acceleration
may make the difference between a case being ready for argument when the Court's calendar has an
opening and the calendar slot going unfilled. This early announcement also gives the illusion of allowing
the lawyers to get a quicker start on meeting the briefing schedule; they may begin drafting their briefs
on the weekend instead of waiting until Monday afternoon.
When the Court's argument calendar is complete, usually by the end of January, the
announcement of granted cases reverts back to Monday mornings. Cases granted after January generally
will not be heard until the following Term, so there is plenty of time to complete the 90-day briefing
schedule before an argument is scheduled.
This change in practice was done, no doubt, as a practical accommodation to the Court's needs
and based on the assumption that there was no downside to the change. Yet, this seemingly harmless
change has created a number of issues for the news media and for coverage of the Court. It has given
the Supreme Court press corps less time to prepare their notes and background on the cases that are
granted and less time to write their news stories on those cases. A number of full-time Supreme Court
correspondents traditionally used Thursday and Friday as preparation days to sift through and read
petitions scheduled for consideration by the Court that week. The preparation days have now been cut
in half for the journalists, and the lost day cannot be replaced since other Court activities occupy the
reporters on the other weekdays. It is hard to imagine that anyone would argue that giving the press
corps less preparation and writing time would be an improvement.
There may be another unintended consequence of this last change in procedure. With reporters
writing their stories about granted cases on Friday for publication on Saturday, it is much more difficult
to persuade newspaper editors and television news directors on Monday to devote space to stories
about denied cases. Generally, the real legal story is in the granted cases, and the denied petitions offer
only news of more general interest. When reporters could begin their stories with the important news
that certain cases were granted and would be decided by the Supreme Court, editors were also willing
to indulge a few denied cases to round out the stories. It is much more difficult to justify a story that
is filled only with denied cases, since those cases have no legal value as far as the Supreme Court is
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concerned. Given the criticism of some misleading reporting about denied cases,45 perhaps less emphasis
on rejected cases in news stories is an improvement rather than a problem. There may be another aspect
of this development worth noting, although any conclusion along these lines is probably premature. The
handful of regular reporters who devote full-time to the Supreme Court have traditionally read more
petitions than just about anyone else in the legal community except the Justices and their law clerks. In
the unending national dialogue about the proper role of the Supreme Court in a democratic society and
more specifically about how many and what kinds of cases the Supreme Court should be deciding," the
Supreme Court "regulars" in the press corps could contribute to the debate because they had a
somewhat unique perspective on the legal landscape of cases and issues coming to the Court. As
reporting about denied petitions diminishes in both volume and importance, the incentives to the
reporters to keep up with the petitions filed in the Supreme Court and the willingness of their editors
to give them the time to read those appeals will decline. The ability of those reporters to contribute their
knowledge of the Supreme Court's docket to the ongoing debate will also decline.
Some reporters who regularly cover the Court suggest that the Justices might reconsider the
change taking into account the negative consequences that were almost certainly not previously
weighed. An alternative might be to change the Supreme Court Rules to reduce the briefing schedule
from 90 days to 87 days when the Court deems it necessary to expedite a case to fill the calendar. The
announcement of the Court's action could remain on Monday mornings, the lawyers could have a
weekend off, and the briefing schedule could still be satisfied.
Conclusion
The relationship between the United States Supreme Court and the journalists who cover the
Court is an unusual one in our society. Because of the differences among the Supreme Courts of the
Americas in jurisdiction, procedure, volume and nature of cases, civil law tradition versus common law
development and many other factors, it is difficult to suggest that the news media - Supreme Court
relationship in the United States should serve as a model for the process in other nations. Despite these
differences, it is essential that Supreme Courts everywhere continue to come to grips with the means
of communicating their vital work to the citizenry, for without that effort the critical wellspring of public
credibility and the independence that rests on it cannot long exist.
45 See text accompanying note 39, supra.
46 See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 Sup. CT. REV.
403 (1996).
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THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA AND THE MEDIA
By James W. O'Reilly
® forthcoming, St. Louis University Law Journal
INTRODUCTION
The impetus for this note came from a very illuminating conversation I had with Professor
Steven Wermeil in Panama City in January 1998. We were comparing notes about the way our
respective Supreme Courts deal with the media. Of course, we came at this topic from completely
different perspectives. As is apparent from his paper, above, he questioned why the United States
Supreme Court did not do more to enable the media to cover the Court's work. As may become
apparent from what follows, I am of the view that the Supreme Court of Canada goes to quite
extraordinary lengths to accommodate the media. Whether the U.S. Supreme Court or the Supreme
Court of Canada is in fact doing enough in this respect is for others to judge. What is clear, however,
is that the two Courts do things differently.
My aim here is embarrassingly modest. I hope merely to describe the media relations measures
taken by the Supreme Court of Canada and to set out some of the issues and implications that arise from
them. As such, this is really no more than a companion piece to Professor Wermeil's more scholarly
paper. Nothing said here should be taken as criticism of the way other courts, including the U.S.
Supreme Court, address the same matters.
THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL OFFICER
Since 1984, the Supreme Court of Canada has staffed a position called Executive Legal Officer
(ELO) whose role is to assist the Chief Justice in the discharge of his numerous and varied
responsibilities.' The ELO is appointed by the Chief Justice for a two- or three-year term. Of the six
ELOs in the Court's history, five were appointed from law faculties.2
'The Chief Justice, in addition to his judicial duties as a member of the Court, is responsible for the overall
administration of the Court, is Chairman of the Canadian Judicial Council (a statutory body responsible for judicial
policy and judicial discipline) and is Chairman of the Board of Governors of the National Judicial Institute
(responsible for the delivery of education programs to the judiciary. The ELO serves as Secretary to the Board of
Governors). As Chief Justice of Canada, the Chief Justice also has numerous representational responsibilities which
mainly involve ceremonial and speaking engagements across Canada and abroad.
2The author, appointed ELO in 1997, was an academic lawyer in sole practice.
344
The ELO acts as the principal liaison between the Court and the media. As well be described
below, this role includes daily contact with the media as well as scheduled briefings.
THE MEDIA RELATIONs ACTIVITIES OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL OFFICES
1. The Off-the-Record Rule
It must first be emphasized that the ELO's relationship with the media is, without exception, on
an "off-the-record, for information only, not for attribution" basis.' This is obviously an unusual policy
for a media relations officer to apply but it is one that, for the most part, works very well at the Supreme
Court of Canada. There are a few reasons why this is so. First, the ELO is not a "spokesman" for the
Court, although he4 is the contact person or liaison for almost all press inquiries. He is not considered
a spokesman because the Supreme Court of Canada, as with most courts, really speaks only through
its judgments. Indeed, members of the Court generally do not comment, except in a descriptive way,
on their judgments. The reasoning behind this circumspection is that judgments themselves contain all
of what the Court wished to say on the issues brought to it for resolution. Concurrences or dissents are
based entirely on what is said in the official, written judgments, not on how members of the Court might
characterize the issues or conclusions in speeches or interviews. Thus, if a judge were to qualify or
expand on a judgment outside the Court, some of his or her Colleagues might well change their minds
about whether they agreed or disagreed with the judgment itself Among other consequences, this
would obviously diminish the certainty that now accompanies the rendering of a judgment from the
Court. For similar reasons, the comments of the ELO should not interfere with or dilute the clarity or
moral force of the Court's judgments.
A second reason for the "off-the-record" rule, is that it permits the ELO extraordinary freedom
in what he says about the Court's work. This is something the media actually seem to appreciate
enormously and, therefore, it contributes to their willingness to abide by a policy they would otherwise
probably find philosophically objectionable. Often the questions put to the ELO are not about the
judgments themselves but about their overall significance, their antecedents, if any, and their national
implications. The ELO's answers to these kinds of questions allow journalism to decide how much
attention to give a particular judgment, where to go for further comment on it and, perhaps most
importantly, how much time to spend on actually trying to understand it.
Another way of looking at the "off-the-record" rule at the Court, therefore, is not as a limit on
the media but as an enhancement of the freedom of expression of the ELO. Needless to say, this raises
some issues from the ELO's point of view. The ELO must decide for himself how much should be said
about the Court's judgments. Certainly, it is not the ELO's role to replace the commentary journalists
might get from the parties, their counsel or academic observers. Because of the "off-the-record" rule,
A statement to this effect is posted on the door to the Press Room at the Supreme Court of Canada.
4All ELOs to date have been male.
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his comments obviously could not serve to flesh out a journalist's coverage. At the same time, it is not
the ELO's job simply to defend the Court's judgments, Nor could he. It would be impossible to defend
equally all majority judgments and all dissents simultaneously. The ELO's role falls somewhere in
between, and each of the six ELOs has probably defined that role in his own way. I look at it this way
- the ELO is in a fairly high-profile position in the Canadian legal world. My predecessors were all
highly respected legal scholars. Presumably, they were chosen not just for their reputations and
discretion but also for their familiarity with the Court's work and their ability to analyse its judgments
in all areas thoroughly, quickly and fairly. Accordingly, it follows that the ELO should use whatever
analytical legal talents he may possess in explaining to the media the significance of the Court's
judgments. Fortunately, there is also a practical check on the extent of the ELO's comments. The media
are generally in too big a hurry to listen to a lengthy discourse on any one judgment. They generally
want comments in two or three sentences.
The third reason for the "off-the-record" rule is that it is consistent with the very purpose for
which the ELO performs the media relations function. The ELO is there to help the media understand
the Court's judgments and assist in the process of communicating their contents and likely impact to the
public. In this sense, the ELO is rather like a tutorial leader for a group of rather energetic, often frantic
and occasionally bewildered "graduate students" In order to be of greatest assistance to them, the ELO
will sometimes have to describe or characterize issues m such a manner, let us say, that would differ
from how members of the Court might do so publicly or wish to have officially attributed to it. As such,
the off-the-record rule reinforces the educative purpose of having an official court officer discuss cases
with journalists.
The foregoing reasons assure voluntary compliance with'the off-the-record rule on the part of
the media. In fact, it is often representatives of the media who will speak up at the ELO's media
briefings to remind their colleagues of the rule. This is in part because a violation of the rule would
certainly jeopardize continuation of the ELO's media relations role.
There have been occasional violations of the rule. Only one that I am aware of was deliberate
rather than inadvertent. On that occasion, the Chief Justice spoke to the journalist involved directly and
informed him that if he failed to respect the rule, the Chief Justice would inform the media that the
ELO's services would no longer be made available to them and would publicly identify the person
responsible for their discontinuation. There has been total compliance since then.
2. Media Briefings
The ELO has four types of formal briefing sessions with media representatives. I use the term
"formal" advisedly - these briefings are "formal" only in the sense that they are held at a specific time
and place, usually with several day's notice, They are otherwise very informal. Five years ago,' there
'See the discussion of the media relations role performed by the Executive Legal Officer in Sharpe, Robert
J., "The Role of a Media Spokesperson for the Courts - The Supreme Court of Canada Experience" [1990] 1 Media
and Communications Law Review 271.
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was only one form of briefing - the judgment day briefing. My predecessor introduced pre-session
briefings and I have added the two others - pre-hearing briefings and pre- judgment day briefings.
Before describing the briefings, a word of explanation about the process by which the Court
delivers its judgments is required. Usually, the Court issues its judgments on Thursday mornings at 9:45
a.m. The rule is that judgments are issued when they are ready. This means that judgments may come
down at any point in the calendar year. The Court will generally announce on the previous Friday which
judgments are to be released through a press release and Internet announcement. It is not every
Thursday that judgments come down, but there is generally at least one judgment day each month. In
a week where there may be several judgments of major significance, the Court will spread release of the
judgments over two days (i.e. Thursday and Friday) as an accommodation to the media. In 1997, the
Court handed down a total of 107 judgments, with 72 of them being formal written judgments as
opposed to oral judgments delivered directly from the bench at the time of the hearing.
(i) Pre-Session Briefings
The ELO provides the media a briefing a week or two prior to the commencement of each
session of the Court's sitting (Fall, Winter and Spring). The purpose of these briefings is to give media
a sense of what kinds of cases the Court will be hearing during that particular session. ELO will
describe the basic facts of each case, its route to the Court, the judgments below and the issues that arise
for the Court's consideration. This briefing alerts the media to any particularly newsworthy cases
coming up in the near future and assists them in planning whether or how to cover specific cases. For
example, they may research a case interests them and produce a story about the case on the eve of it
being heard or the day it is argued.
At this briefing, the media are also provided with general facts and figures about the upcoming
session - for example, a calendar of the upcoming cases, the total number of appeals the numbers of
criminal and civil appeals, and a subject matter breakdown. The media are provided charts indicating
the subject matter categories into which the cases fall and a brief summary of the cases to be heard each
day.
As mentioned, the main purpose of these briefings is to assist the media in organizing themselves
to cover upcoming cases. In other words, it is purely for background purposes. However, sometimes
a journalist will write an article prior to each session outlining the upcoming cases and the general
statistics referred to above.
(i) Pre-Hearing Briefings
These are rare. They are given only when a particularly important case is to be heard by the
Court and the media may need assistance in preparing to cover it. For example, in a case involving the
constitutionality of Quebec separation, which was heard over the course of five days in February 1998,
a briefing was provided to the media the week before the hearing. The briefing covered all of the legal
issues arising in the case and summarized the arguments of all those appearing in it. In addition, the
ELO was available to the media each day of the hearing in the Press Room.
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(iii) Pre-judgment Day Briefing
It is now routine for the ELO to have briefings with the media the day before judgments are
released. In reality, these briefings largely duplicate the judgment day sessions except, of course, the
results of the cases are not revealed in them. The purpose is to remind the journalists what the cases
are about, what happened in the courts below and the issues that fell to the Court to decide. This allows
them to prepare a good part of their stories before the judgment is actually handed down and, possibly,
prepare a story in anticipation of the judgment. Alternatively, it allows them to decide that the cases
that week are of little interest and that they do not need to attend on judgment day.
So far, the media interest in these briefings has not been great. Still, they have produced one
effect that may justify their continuation even though attendance is small. It is now common to see
stories on judgment days about the cases in which judgments are about to be released. These stories
are often a product of the pre-judgment day briefings. In turn, they increase the media interest in the
judgments, attendance at the briefings and overall coverage of the cases,
One of the reasons why these prejudgment day briefings were introduced is because the Court
has received periodic requests from various media representatives for a "look-up" procedure on
judgment days. They were asking for a system whereby journalists could receive the judgments at 9:
00 a.m. on a judgment day with an embargo on disclosing the results until the usual 9:45 a.m. release
time, similar to the process that applies in Canada to the release of federal budgets. This would allow
them more time to prepare their stories as some of them try to have a story ready in time for a 1 0:00
a.m. news broadcast. The Court's policy, however, is that it is improper to disclose the results of a case
before the parties have been informed, even if the persons to whom they were disclosed had an
obligation not to publish them. As such, the Court has been reluctant to introduce a "lock-up" system.
As an alternative, pre-judgment day briefings were arranged so that reporters could have their stories
ready in advance of judgment day, but for a discussion of the actual results.
(iv) Judgment Day Briefings
Depending on the number and the importance of the judgments being handed down on a
particular Thursday, judgment day briefings will begin at anywhere from 9:00 to 9:30 a.m. Prior to 9:45
a.m., when the judgments are wheeled into the Press Room on a trolley, the ELO provides background
infomiation on the cases and answers questions about them without revealing the results. This
background information includes such matters as the facts, the legal issues raised and a discussion of
why these issues may be important. Generally, the journalists decide the order in which the cases will
be discussed.
When the judgments are made available, the interest of the media shifts immediately to the
results in the cases, the division, if any, within the Court and the reasons given in support of the
decisions. The amount of time given to discussing the results of the ones varies. Of course, all of the
media want to know immediately who won and by what margin. But interest in the details and the
nuances of the cases varies considerably. The electronic media will generally want a one sentence
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summary so that they may run downstairs to the lobby and make an immediate contribution to a live
news broadcast. The others will usually want a more detailed summary of the judgments with reference
to the most important paragraphs - those with colourful (i.e. highly quotable) passages, important
conclusions or summaries.
When necessary in the interests of ensuring that a judgment is properly understood, the ELO
may go beyond being merely reactive to the questions raised by tlhe media and attempt to explain the
cases much the way as would a law professor to a class. These sessions have on occasion been more
like a seminar than a press conference.
3. Other Media-Related Matters
(i) Informal Inquiries
It is a rare day when the ELO does not receive at least one call from a journalist. Usually, there
are several. Generally, the callers are looking for information of one sort or another - when a particular
case is going to be heard, whether someone has filed an application for leave to appeal in a particular
case, when judgment is expected in a particular case, who the lawyers are for such and such a party, etc.
Most of these questions can be answered with very little difficulty. However, some require
considerable care.
(ii) Media Relations Committee
The Court has established a special committee to deal with media relations. Its current chair is
Justice Peter Cory and the other members are Justices lacobucci and Bastarache. The ELO is also a
member of and acts as secretary to this committee. The media representatives on the committee are
chosen by the media themselves and represent both the anglophone and francophone print and electronic
media. The Committee meets one or twice a year to discuss matters of mutual interest. In addition, the
Committee has held seminars with bureau chiefs from all the major media outlets to discuss the general
operation of the Court.
(iii) Broadcasting
Almost all of the hearings before the Supreme Court of Canada are broadcast gavel-to-gavel by
a public access channel.6 This is the result of an agreement between the Court and the broad which
established a "pilot project" in 1995, and which has been renewed annually since then. Occasionally,
cases are broadcast live. More commonly, cases are taped and broadcast at a later date, often on
Saturday nights. Under the agreement, the broadcaster may send a request to the Court for permission
to broadcast the hearings in particular cases. As a rule, it requests permission to broadcast all the cases.
The parties are informed that, unless they object, the proceedings may be broadcast. Generally
speaking, the parties do not object and, unless there is a publication ban in place, the Court will grant
the broadcaster's requests.
6The Cable Public Affairs Channel (CPAC).
71n cases where there is a publication ban in relation to an individual's identity (e.g. a young offender or the
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From time to time other broadcasters will request permission to broadcast particular hearings.
These requests go to the members of the Court Media Relations Committee who, provided the request
is to broadcast the hearing gavel to gavel, will generally grant it.
Until 1997, the Court only allowed broadcasting of entire cases, not clips. This meant no
broadcasters could use clips from cases that had been broadcast gavel to gavel. At present Court's
Policy is to allow the use of clips by any broadcasters, so long as the full oral hearing from which the
clips are taken has been or will be broadcast at some point in time, whether by broadcaster using the
clips or some other. The current broadcasting agreement obliges broadcasters to use their best efforts
to ensure that the clips, as well as sound bites or commentary, are "balance and fair to the parties and
all concerned in the appeals". This is really an unenforceable instruction of course, except that in the
event of any use of clips that the Court found to be deliberately skewed or malicious, the Court would
certainly reconsider its position under the broadcasting agreement.
In addition to the broadcasting of its hearings, the Court has also allowed broadcasters to set
up cameras in the Court's lobby, both for purposes of stand-up reporting and ongoing commentary
about a case by reporters or legal experts. For example, for the entire week of hearings on Quebec
separation case, both the English- and French-speaking all-news channels were given permission to set
up temporary "studios" in the Court' s lobby, so that ongoing commentary on the hearings could be
provided directly from the Court by various constitutional experts.
4. Issues and Implications
At present, relations between the media and the Court appear to be satisfactory from the
perspective of both parties. However, there are two somewhat overlapping areas of potential
controversy about the Court's media relations activities on the horizon. The first relates to television
coverage. The second involves the off-the-record rule.
() Television
Journalists as a whole, it is fair to say, have a professional commitment to obtaining more
information than their sources are willing to make available. This is, no doubt, a good thing. At the
Supreme Court of Canada, it means that the journalists covering the Court are constantly looking for
more and more information and greater and greater accommodation of their interests.
At present the greatest pressures seem to be coming from the electronic media; in particular,
from the public access channel with which the Court has a formal agreement. The pressures are of two
kinds. The first involves matters generally of a technical nature. The second relates to actual
programming.
complainant in a sexual assault case), the Court will not give permission to broadcast. The concern is that there is
a risk of revealing the person's identity during oral argument whether inadvertently or out of necessity.
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The main courtroom of the Supreme Court of Canada is outfitted with voice-activated cameras
and microphones. The equipment was originally installed to permit the Court to hear cases by video-
conference. As it turned out, the equipment was readily adaptable to television broadcast of the Court's
proceedings. At present, having obtained substantial viewership for the Court's hearings, the
broadcaster is keen to enhance the production values of its broadcasts. This would involve installation
of more sophisticated cameras and microphones, as well as reliance on remote-control manipulation of
the cameras so as to achieve greater control over the television image (i.e. zoom-in, zoom-out, scanning
of the panel, training the camera on persons other than the speaker, etc.). In other words, the idea is
to create a more visually interesting broadcast.
To this point, the Court has expressed no opinion on the subject, other than to say that the costs
of any upgrade of its electronic equipment, which is still adequate for purposes of video-conferencing,
will have to be done by the broadcaster. However, there is an issue that will have to be faced when the
Court contemplates an enhancement of its electronic paraphernalia. It is possible that a more visually
interesting broadcast of the Court's hearings will involve a less accurate portrayal of its proceedings.
Given the current equipment, the spoken word is paramount. The cameras focus only on the person
speaking. Under the proposed re-configuration of the Court's equipment the viewer may see, for
example, a negative facial reaction on the part of one member of the Court to what is being said by a
barrister representing one of the parties to the case. It may be that the other eight members of the Court
were actually for more favourably inclined to the argument. But the image conveyed to the public may
indicate otherwise. Of course, the possibility of distortion would be ever greater through use of clips
as compared to gavel-to-gavel broadcast.
In terms of the substance of broadcasts, there is great interest in creating other kinds of
programming centered on the Court's work. In particular, our public access channel would very much
like to be put in a situation of equivalency with the print media in respect of the briefings by the
Executive Legal Officer. In other words, it would like to broadcast these briefings or some suitable
alternative to them that would inform viewers about the Court's hearings and judgments. Obviously,
this would be very difficult to achieve without intruding on the off-the-record rule. If the Executive
Legal Officer may comment on television about a case or hearing, how could he then not be quoted?
It may be that a suitable format for these programmes could be arrived at, for example, by having the
Executive Legal Officer give nothing but purely factual information about each case and a very simple
summary of the issues arising in it. This may be possible for all forms of briefing other than the
judgment day briefing. But there is no getting around the fact that there would be a dilution of the off-
the-record rule. While the matters on which the ELO could be quoted could be kept to the banal and
the mundane, the question would surely arise whether the ELO could be quoted in relation to equivalent
matters in the printed media. The result would be a distinction between matters on which the ELO
could be quoted and matters that would remain off-the-record. Not only would such a distinction be
difficult to make, it would have to be made clear in each conversation the ELO had with a journalist
which matters were which.
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In the face of such difficulties, the Court will surely be wary of permitting the ELO to go on
camera. At the same time, the pressures on the Court to participate in the development of informative
television programming is likely to persist and increase.
(ii) The Off-the-Record Rule
As mentioned, the off-the-record rule actually serves media interests, Accordingly, there is a
strong incentive for journalists to comply with it. As mentioned, however, there are already pressures
coming from the electronic media to attenuate the rule. It is quite possible that in the not too distant
future there will be similar efforts by the print media at least to soften the rule.
There are already some signs of dissatisfaction with the off-the-record rule on the part of print
journalists. From time to time, journalists will be looking for some information from the ELO and will
want to quote some source for that information. For example, suppose a case in which there is
considerable public and media interest is re-scheduled from the fall to the winter term. A journalist
wishes to report on the change. She calls the office of the Chief Justice to get details. The Executive
Legal Officer confirms the new date and explains why the change was necessary (e.g. illness of one of
the counsel). There is no principled reason why the ELO could not be quoted on this purely factual
matter. Yet, under the current rule he could not go on the record. On occasions, the Registrar of the
Court might speak to the media on such an issue and she could then at least be cited as a source.
Otherwise, journalists would have to make statements such as "the details were confirmed with the Chief
Justice's office" or "court officials confirmed the new date". This is as close as journalists can currently
come to quoting the ELO. Some of them complain about the fact that they cannot quote the ELO even
in relation to the most mundane factual matters.
These complaints are reasonable. There ought to be an official court source for a certain range
of matters in relation to which commentary on cases or other substantive matters is neither sought nor
supplied. The problem with this, as alluded to above, is that compliance with such an arrangement could
be very difficult to administer, monitor and enforce.
Yet, it is possible to imagine an arrangement under which the ELO might be quotable on a
certain range of matters. It would require, the ELO himself, often in consultation with the Chief Justice
of course, to decide when he could be quoted and when he could not. From the media perspective,
voluntary compliance with a more limited off-the-record rule would likely be as full as with the current
absolute rule.
The main concern of the Court and, more particularly, of the ELO, is that the comments of the
Executive Legal Officer should never become an issue. If, for example, one could quote the ELO's
summary of a case that was about to be had by the Court, counsel appearing in the case could well read
those comments in the press. One could easily foresee a situation where, at the actual hearing of the
case, counsel felt it necessary to refer to the ELO's characterization of the issues or summary of the facts
in order to point out supposed inaccuracies in them. The ELO's comments should never influence the
way a case is argued or be a source of disagreement between the parties. Still, it may be possible to
352
avoid this consequence while at the same time permitting quotation of the ELO on certain matters.
Given the pressure coming from the electronic media for reasonable parity, some such arrangement
could well be introduced at the Court within the next five years or so.
5. Conclusions
The Supreme Court of Canada goes to considerable lengths to assist the media in
communicating its judgments to the Canadian public. It could, of course, do more and it is quite
possible that, notwithstanding the magnitude of its current efforts, it could be convinced to enhance its
media relations in the future, particularly in the area of television programming and a possible relaxing
of the off-the-record rule that currently applies to statements of the Executive Legal Officer of the
Court.
It is frequently pointed out to the Court, most often by the electronic media, that it must accept
the consequences of its decision to be reasonably media friendly. According to some, one of those
consequences is that having opened the door to the media a certain distance, there will be constant
pressure on the Court to open the door as far as it can possibly be swung. This is, it is argued, an
inevitable result of having, an active media relations programme at the Court. The Court would
undoubtedly dispute this line of reasoning. At the same time, truth be told, the media attention that is
focused on the Court, for the most part, serves the Court well. It shows the Court as a solemn place
where vexing legal and social problems are presented, discussed, debated and, to some extent, resolved.
It helps assure that the Court's judgments are accurately presented to the public and, in turn, that many
of the comments and criticisms that are made of them are at least based on a fair understanding of what
the Court actually decided. Indeed, in reality, the ELO can influence considerably the way some
journalists report on the Court's judgments. Some of them will actually ask for the ELO's reaction to
a proposed lead. Others will ask for a description of the Court's judgment or a characterization of its
importance and then will write a story around the ELO's comments without attribution.
Accordingly, it is quite likely that the Court will continue to allow its relationship with media
to evolve in a direction favourable to greater media freedom to report on the Court. The primary
responsibility for this evolving relationship will fall to future Executive Legal Officers.
353
